


JPRS-UMA-94-009

4 March 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-009

CONTENTS

4 March 1994

RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

POLICY

Senior Officers Protest Official Silence on Ogarkov's Death	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Feb]	1
Duma Security Committee's Agenda Outlined	[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 Feb]	2
Events Surrounding Military Intervention Against White House	[PRAVDA 15 Feb]	4
Why Democrats Fear Army	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 1 Feb]	7

GROUND TROOPS

'Gyurza' 9-mm Pistol	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]	9
----------------------	--------------------------------	---

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

List of Aviation Schools, Specialties	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Feb]	10
---------------------------------------	--------------------------------	----

NAVAL FORCES

Industry Chief Bemoans Naval Construction Halt	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Feb]	11
Two Pacific Fleet Submersibles Out of Commission	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Feb]	14

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Wages, Social Protection of Civilian Defense Workers	[TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 9, 1993]	14
--	---	----

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Pyankov on Missions, Prospects of CIS Peacekeeping in Tajikistan	[ROSSIYA No 4, 26 Jan-1 Feb]	19
Support to Collective Peacekeeping Forces	[TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 9, 1993]	20
Peacekeeping Operations in Former USSR	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Feb]	23

COSSACK AFFAIRS

Cossack Border Outposts in Far East Set Up	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Feb]	25
Cossacks: News Briefs	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Feb]	26

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian-Georgian Talks Yield Three Bases in Georgia	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb]	27
---	-------------------------------	----

UKRAINE

Heavy Financial Burden Posed by Aircraft Maintenance Requirements	[NARODNA ARMIYA 18 Dec]	28
---	-------------------------------	----

BALTIC STATES

Estonia Ready To Produce NATO Caliber Ammunition [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]	29
Minister on Reorganization of National Volunteer Defense Service [LETUVOS RITAS No 2, 14-21 Jan]	30
Condition of Military Airports Viewed [TIESA No 26, 8 Feb]	30

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Recruiting Mercenaries in Russia [IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]	32
Defense Minister Views Career, Karabakh Conflict [SOBESEDNIK No 6, Feb]	33
Military Call-Up Results Announced [RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA 17 Dec]	37

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Weapons General Designers Appeal to Yeltsin [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 19 Jan]	39
Beneficiaries of Reorganization of Russian Arms Exports [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 19 Jan]	40

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Defense Industry's Plight Detailed [PRAVDA 24 Feb]	43
Bankruptcies in Defense Sector Not Inevitable [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Jan]	44
Khabarovsk Military Industry Enterprises To Get R70 Billion [SEGODNYA 10 Feb]	46

SECURITY SERVICES

Former KGB Subunit Transferred to MVD [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Feb]	46
--	----

POLICY

Senior Officers Protest Official Silence on Ogarkov's Death

94UM0238A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 4

[Article: "Vengeance Through Silence: Is This the Way To Bid Farewell to the Saviors of the Fatherland on Their Last Voyage?"]

[Text] On 26 January we buried our comrade-in-arms, a participant of the Great Patriotic War, former Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, General of the Army V. I. Varennikov, men who served with Nikolay Vasilyevich in the Great Patriotic War, and representatives of veteran and public organizations bade a fond farewell to the decedent at his funeral in Novodevichye Cemetery. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's funeral was organized by the Ministry of Defense fully in accordance with accepted ritual, established procedure, and honors. Nonetheless we cannot shake a feeling of anger and insult in connection with, mildly speaking, the strange inattention to the decedent on the part of other official agencies and the mass media. Thus, only KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carried a notice of the death of Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, in an obituary undersigned by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. All other publications, television and radio (except for the "Mayak" program) remained silent as if nothing had happened. For this reason thousands of citizens, including many war veterans, did not have the opportunity to part with the decedent, and to see him off on his final journey.

On 27 January only SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA carried information on the funeral. Once again the other publications were silent. Not a single television program devoted a single minute to this funereal event on the day of the funeral and on subsequent days. And yet, on 26 January television viewers were shown, time and time again, the harmless attack by some madman with a starting pistol on England's Prince Charles, a lengthy interview with the bankrupted former ministers and shock therapists Gaydar and Fedorov, and other unimportant stories. But no time or room could be found on the airwaves for a broadcast or even a brief televised news report on the state—we emphasize the state—funeral of a Marshal of the Soviet Union, veteran of the Great Patriotic War and Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Sunday, 30 January "Itogi" program the anchorman uttered not a single word about the death and funeral of Marshal N. V. Ogarkov.

We feel certain that this is not simply the professional neglect of persons in positions of leadership in the mass media, and not only a deliberate demonstration of their attitude toward the decedent through the method of silence. This is but one manifestation and a logical

continuation of the discreditation of the armed forces, of merited military chiefs, and of veterans of the Great Patriotic War who saved the world from fascism, begun back in the years of "perestroika" by certain circles and strata of our society, and still going on practically without end.

As far as Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's funeral is concerned, Ogarkov apparently simply cannot be forgotten by some of our "reformers" working in government corridors of power and the mass media for the fundamental position he took in the years of "perestroika." Everyone remembers his prophetic statement at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union immediately following the events of August 1991, in which Nikolay Vasilyevich warned of the danger of the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union, in which he turned out to be absolutely correct. Nor can they forget N. V. Ogarkov for his leadership of the Union of War and Labor Veterans, the members of which supported, in their overwhelming majority, the attempt by the lawful leadership of the Soviet Union in August 1991 to avert the trouble into which the country was steadily slipping. Nor could the ill-wishers forget Nikolay Vasilyevich for his stern, principled protests as inspector general of the armed forces against the unjustified "treaties" hastily concluded by Gorbachev to reduce, and for practical purposes to disarm the army and navy, the division of our mighty Armed Forces of the Soviet Union into "sovereign" chunks following the Belovezhskaya agreement, and the distribution of military equipment and armament, together with personnel, among the new so-called "independent" states that appeared suddenly in place of our former union republics.

We are outraged by the fact that such an insulting attitude toward merited military chiefs departing from this life, and through them toward the Armed Forces, is being planted in Russia. We demand cessation of such a practice, and payment of worthy honor to glorious Soviet military chiefs.

[Signed] V. Varennikov, General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union; I. Pavlovskiy, General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union; K. Kochetov, General of the Army; V. Govorov, General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union; N. Grachev, General of the Army; A. Lizichev, General of the Army; V. Postikov, General of the Army; V. Mikhalkin, Marshal of Artillery; A. Konstantinov, Marshal of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union; I. Pstygo, Marshal of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union; A. Belov, Marshal of Signal Troops; V. Chernavin, Admiral of the Fleet, Hero of the Soviet Union; I. Kapitanets, Admiral of the Fleet; N. Sergeyev, Admiral of the Fleet; G. Yegorov, Admiral of the Fleet, Hero of the Soviet Union; K. Makarov, Admiral of the Fleet; A. Sorokin, Admiral of the Fleet; V. Abolins, Colonel-General; P. Altukhov, Colonel-General; G. Dolnikov, Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union; A. Merezko, Colonel-General; V. Myasnikov, Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union; Yu. Naumenko, Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union; V. Pikalov,

Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union; V. Popov, Colonel-General; A. Fedorov, Colonel-General; N. Amelko, Admiral; V. Korobov, Admiral, Hero of the Soviet Union; V. Mikhaylin, Admiral; V. Sidorov, Admiral; V. Sysoyev, Admiral; N. Khovrin, Admiral; Yu. Kalinin, Lieutenant-General; N. Krivosheyev, Lieutenant-General; M. Titov, Lieutenant-General; N. Shapalin, Lieutenant-General (a total of 74 signatures by military chiefs).

G. Zyuganov, chairman, Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, deputy to the State Duma;

S. Baburin, chairman, Board of the Russian All-People's Union, deputy to the State Duma;

E. Volodin, co-chairman, National Salvation Front, Professor;

G. Samoylov, Lieutenant-General, chairman, Moscow Club of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Russia and Cavaliers of the Three Degrees of the Order of Glory.

In addition the letter was supported by:

- the Officers' Union; the "Officers for Rebirth of the Fatherland" Movement;
- the "Russian Sevastopol" Public Committee;
- the Troitskiy Orthodox Cathedral.

Duma Security Committee's Agenda Outlined

PM1702132194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, by Valentin Maslennikov: date and place not given: "Without Bias or Timidity"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In 20 years Viktor Ilyukhin progressed from ordinary investigator in a Penza backwater to first deputy chief of a USSR Prosecutor's Office main administration; he headed the administration overseeing the application of laws on state security. He became politically known after he instituted criminal proceedings against Gorbachev, general secretary of the then-ruling CPSU, for which he was dismissed from the Prosecutor's Office. He is now chairman of the State Duma Security Committee. At the editorial office's request Viktor Ivanovich shares his thoughts on the plans and prospects for the work of this most important section of the new parliament:

[Ilyukhin] Many people are troubled by my party membership: How come a communist has been elected to such a responsible post in a legislative organ of a democratic state? But I do not see that this interferes in any way with a collegial organ's fruitful work. Incidentally, all three of my deputies belong to different parties which society also regards equivocally. Viktor Pimenovich Mironov represents "Russia's Choice," Sergey

Semenovich Boskholov the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and Nina Viktorovna Krivelskaya the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. They are all first-class jurists and professionals in the best sense of the word.

From the very first steps in our joint work we have set aside our party bias and sought a common language and mutual understanding. The committee has a total of 20 members and the volume of work is enormous. It is encouraging that the other committee members are also highly qualified jurists. We have expert lawyers, people with experience of working in courts and internal affairs organs, and attorneys with a wealth of practical experience.

At our very first session we found out that a collective of like minds is forming and that everyone is concerned about one thing: The lack of a clear concept of the country's national security, thought out in the finest detail. So first of all we will be working hard to elaborate one.

Not an easy task, because we are faced with a whole range of interconnected problems which are difficult to solve. Taking national security to mean first of all **the consolidation of a state's territorial integrity and unity**, we are singling out four main facets. They are borders, customs, federal security services including border troops, and, of course, economic security. All this needs to be clearly enshrined in legislation.

The next set of pressing problems is **legal support for the fight against crime** on the basis of a long-term, wide-ranging program which includes scientific substantiation, finances, cadre policy, and many other things.

The implementation of this program is also directly linked with **the direct protection of the person and his individuality**, which we are wont to talk about a lot but which we in fact push into the background. So an urgent change of emphasis from words to deeds is needed. Incidentally, what is required in this respect is a review of the state of emergency legislation, which must also protect people first and foremost and not be reduced to sharing out authority.

Finally, the fourth set is **an expert criminological assessment** of all draft laws passing through the Duma, irrespective of who has prepared them. It is up to us to detect all the flaws in legislative acts which could substantially complicate the criminogenic situation in the country.

Of course, the committee will not be able to cope with this volume of work alone. We plan to bring in expert specialists and scientific subdivisions of practical experts. Discussion papers are already available. We are finding good understanding in other Duma committees.

At the very first session we defined our priority tasks. They include finalizing work on the Law on Combating Corruption. The attention to this question is easily explained: The crime rate is increasing, there is a tidal

wave of illegal acts, and bribery and mercenary string-pulling have corroded the entire state executive mechanism, including the law-enforcement organs. This retards any healthy transformations in Russia.

Mafia clans are already dictating their policy not only at neighborhood level but also in entire cities and oblasts, and in some places they are even taking control of legislators' activities. This will continue as long as an official at any level is dependent on his boss' will and whim. He must obey only the law and must serve it faithfully and truly.

The law had already been prepared by our predecessors and adopted by the Supreme Soviet, but it was not signed by the president. In my view the reason is not the shortcomings it undoubtedly contains but the struggle between several schools of law, whose representatives were unable to agree among themselves but were able to persuade the president to postpone the law's adoption. Through the efforts of two committees—ours and the one on legislation and judicial reform—we have already held a first hearing on the law and we will soon be submitting it for consideration at a Duma session sitting. It cannot be postponed any longer.

Two other draft laws are next in line—"On the State Protection of Judges and Employees of Law-Enforcement and Control Organs" and "On the Protection of Witnesses, Victims, and Other People Assisting in Legal Proceedings." They brook no delay either. Because judges and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] employees are being murdered, witnesses and victims are being intimidated, and their families are being kept in fear. How can a judge or court official who is besieged, totally dependent, and lacking life's essentials be objective? What is the use of a militiaman who does not feel that he is backed up by state protection? How can the evidence of a witness be relied on if, outside the precincts of the court, he is not protected from the criminals he is accusing?

We predict that these laws will not have an easy passage through the Duma. Not because deputies do not understand their importance and timeliness but because some legislators will think that the state cannot afford them at the moment. Nevertheless, this expenditure must be made if we seriously intend to fight crime and really protect people.

The committee has extensive plans. We have a great deal to do to improve the criminal and criminal-procedure codes and we will be taking part in the drafting of laws on the Prosecutor's Office, the legal profession, the Constitutional Court, and many other things.

I want to single out especially the upcoming work to legislatively enshrine the new status of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS]. This is a difficult question which will certainly provoke many disputes and disagreements. In my opinion the president exceeded his powers by disbanding the Security Ministry. The new

Constitution does not give him the right to autonomously destroy and reform institutions of state authority. In place of what is, especially now, a vitally essential part of the law-enforcement system yet another presidential special service has been formed. There are too many of them as it is.

Something similar can be observed with the MVD. Essentially the enforcement structures are being removed from Prosecutor's Office oversight and judicial and parliamentary control, and levers of authoritarian power are being strengthened. During its reorganization the FCS lost its investigation apparatus. This is a blow to its capability. The shield remains but the sword has been taken away.

I grant that some people will not agree with me, but I will defend my opinion both inside and outside committee sessions. A considerable number of these complex debates lie ahead of us.

Just take the question of borders. It is no longer possible to put up with the large-meshed sieve into which they have now turned. But to construct new ones will require at least five to seven years of intensive work and expenditure equal to twice or three times Russia's annual budget (without drinking, eating, or spending a cent on anything else). There is one solution: To agree with our close neighbors on a single external CIS border.

They cannot protect it by themselves—as eloquently demonstrated by Tajikistan's experience. That means that we must form joint border troops—which requires an interstate accord. We must not shy away from each other but act hand in hand. What is of help here is both our historical experience and the recognition of the prospect of the inevitable unification of the collapsed Union on a new basis.

West Europe's experience indicates the same: Strength through unification. Most of our countries' inhabitants think the same: Because they were cut for real when they were separated, borders were drawn through families and futures. In my opinion the only obstacle now is leaders' political ambitions.

I by no means want to switch the conversation about our committee's plans to the political plane. But when national security is being discussed there is no escaping politics. Our committee does not consider itself to be exceeding its powers in putting forward some urgent demands and recommendations to the Federal Assembly, the country's government, and the Russian president. In particular, in order to achieve our national security the country's and the Foreign Ministry's leaders must urgently agree with all CIS countries that the latter will not wholly or partly join any military bloc opposing Russia. And I believe that a strict demand should be put to our Baltic neighbors: One of the mandatory conditions for the withdrawal of our troops from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is a pledge on their part not to join any military bloc with other states and not to allow foreign military bases to be located on their territory.

So, the tasks facing our committee are complex and crucial, just like the concept of security itself.

Events Surrounding Military Intervention Against White House

94UM0232. Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 94
pp. 1-2

[Article by Yuriy Voronin, former first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: "The Generals Were Playing Politics"]

[Text]

How the Army Found Itself Forced To Fire Upon the People for 26 Hours in a Row in October 1993

General of the Army K. Kobets, people's deputy of the Russian Federation, dropped into my office during the first half of the day on 20 September. He reported that a session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense had just concluded, which was attended by many commanders of troop arms and military districts. K. Kobets informed me that the session had been convened at the initiative of the Minister and at B. Yeltsin's instructions. The Army's participation in possible armed events in the city of Moscow was discussed. There was discussion of the possibility of establishing direct presidential control in the nation on 20 or 21 September, and it was proposed that the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation be dispersed. This would be formalized in a message from the President to the people and in a corresponding decree. This could result in various extreme acts and armed confrontations. Nothing was said about who was to be fought and who was to be protected, however. Many Collegium members were absolutely opposed to the Army's participation in the suppression of street disturbances. This was the function of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Troops. Obviously anticipating the course of events, the Minister of Defense attempted to convince the Collegium members that it might be necessary to move troops into Moscow.

"During our discussion a phone call came in on the direct line from the President. I could not hear what Yeltsin said. We could only see," K. Kobets said, "that after the words 'Just what would you have me to do? Take the 'White House' by storm? The Army is outside of politics. You have repeatedly said so yourself!' the Minister's face turned very red and he was not feeling well. They hung up at the other end. The Minister went into another room and took some medicine. Some time later he returned. The Collegium members and those present unanimously decided to observe strict neutrality and not be drawn into any street disturbances."

After listening to General K. Kobets, I asked him to report on the session of the Ministry of Defense Collegium to R. Khazbulatov, and he headed for there.

I would like to deviate somewhat here from the chronology of events. Special circumstances had brought me into contact with General K. Kobets and certain other generals. It so happened that from the very beginning of my chairmanship of the Commission on the Budget, Plans, Taxes and Prices and then my deputy chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet, hardly not a week went by in which the heads of the MO [Ministry of Defense], the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the MB [Ministry of Security] did not come to me, mainly on matters pertaining to legislative support for the functioning of those agencies, their financing, material and technical support, decisions on the induction of the youth into the army and so forth. Before becoming a member of the Supreme Soviet I worked at defense enterprises in Tataria and then in the Defense Section of the Tatarsk Oblast party committee.

I was frequently in the forces, at various military anniversaries, and took part in formal and family dinners with the generals. They all spoke aloud, without inhibition, of the absence of a precisely defined military doctrine in the nation, talked with suffering about the army's disintegration and the decline of its prestige in the world arena. The only thing they discussed in a lowered voice was who had control of the nuclear button. God forbid that someone should hear that. Nor were they secretive about the causes of the crisis: "What kind of minister do we have"? He was referred to with the same extremely diminutive name used for him throughout the army. This was not familiarity; it was a reflection of the pinnacle of competence. No one referred to Generals Kolesnikov, Mironov or Deynikin in a familiar, simplified manner. They were personalities, although they too were caught up in the "Rodionov syndrome" at a crucial time for Russia. There was nothing surprising about that; the army was torn down, persecuted, degraded and insulted on all sides.

I would point out that this syndrome came into being in the army following the Tbilisi tragedy, in which neo-democrat Sobchak left a black mark. What rage and what thunderbolts he leveled against the command element of the Transcaucasus Military District and the Ministry of Defense as a People's Deputy of the USSR! And it was, after all, thanks to the army that a terrible bloodbath was avoided in Georgia back then, on 9 April 1989. A large disaster was prevented then. Later, this was no longer possible; the army was forced to take a "neutral position." Let the result be judged by those who at this difficult time either remained silent or capitulated to "democrat" Sobchak or took up his position without realizing it, "falling in love with" the sparkling eyes of this destroyer of the nation.

Ultimately, what began with Sobchak's offering led to the Army's direct breakdown. The U.S. has long exercised control over Russia's key areas, of course: politics and the economy. It has now reached even the Army. Many people are probably aware that during Minister of Defense P. Grachev's visit to the U.S. agreement was

reached on the establishment of a joint American-Russian "peacekeeping" force out of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division and Russia's 27th Motorized-Rifle Division. The most amazing thing is that the Russian Minister agreed to the possibility of their use in the CIS countries during a "special period." If, during the recent fall, victory had gone to the Constitution and the Congress of People's Deputies, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Russians would have "gotten to know" firsthand American rapid-reaction forces at strategic CIS facilities: atomic power plants, nuclear installations and so forth.

...The phone on the direct line to R. Khazbulatov rang. He asked us to come to his office immediately. Present there were Colonel-General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, People's Deputy of Russia V. Achadov, advisor on Military Affairs to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Vice President A. Rutskoy and A. Korovnikov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee. M. Kolesnikov had already reported to them on the session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense.

"Mikhail Petrovich has just told us about the session of the Ministry of Defense Collegium. Everything K. Kobets said is confirmed. The Army will adhere to the concept that it is 'outside of politics,'" R. Khazbulatov said. "What are we going to do?"

"We need officially to summon the Minister of Defense to the Supreme Soviet and clarify the situation," someone said. Grachev was not to be found an hour after that or later, however. Nor did he respond to attempts to contact him. We asked M. Kolesnikov jointly with K. Kobets to write a report to the Supreme Soviet. The Chief of the General Staff promised to write the report and bring it to us in an hour. R. Khazbulatov later told me that M. Kolesnikov came to see him an hour later and confirmed everything orally but refused to prepare a written document. From that moment the Army began slowly but certainly to enter into the scenario of a coup d'etat, first demonstrating neutrality toward B. Yeltsin's unconstitutional actions (and this actually played into his hand) and then taking action in support of the putsch.

Throughout all those days, right up until I left the House of Soviets, I spoke with K. Kobets by phone three or four times a day. Like us, he was upset by the fact that the lights had been turned off, there was no hot water and it was not permitted to bring in fuel, food or medicine. He believed that this was being done by brainless block-heads to get the people to rise up and come to the House of Soviets.

For my part, I too complained that power and telephone lines had been disconnected in the Ministry of Defense on 23 September, organic weapons had been taken from ministry workers and generals, and two guards from other departments had been posted at each door. And the generals tolerated this, quietly and timidly discussing the issues raised by the political crisis. The situation

surrounding the Ministry of Defense was heating up, and it was impossible not to see this. The degree of secrecy in the Army increased by the day. M.P. Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, issued a special document altering the procedure for telephone communication between the central agencies of military command and control and the troops. This was unprecedented in peacetime. It essentially meant that Ministry of Defense staff could not independently contact a single military subunit (division, regiment) even on a secure line. Only the chief of the corresponding staff of the troop arm could issue the order, after learning the content of the forthcoming discussion.

All of this shows that neither B. Yeltsin nor P. Grachev was certain how the Army, including the top generals, would conduct themselves in that non-authorized situation which developed after 21 September. They were attempting not only to prevent the "leakage of information" but also to make it difficult for the opponents of Yeltsin and Grachev in the Ministry itself to join forces.

Was General K. Kobets aware of this? I believe he was. At least one fact led me to doubt it.

Some Secretariat staff members came to the office and told me:

"Look, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, General K. Kobets is allegedly in touch with events on Leningradskiy Prospekt and is giving an interview at the Headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, stating that the Army is being ordered to shoot at people.

"That cannot be," I replied, although I was beginning to have doubts. People could not make up such things.

I phoned K. Kobets and was told by his orderly:

"He is at the General Staff and will not be back soon. As soon as he arrives, I shall put him through to you."

I phoned Kobets' dacha. His wife answered. Since we are on friendly terms, we chatted for a while, and I asked her whether she had heard Konstantin Ivanovich's TV presentation.

"No," she answered, "I did not. He is in some kind of mess again."

Much to my surprise, some time later I was told that Minister Grachev had personally played back a recording of our conversation for General K. Kobets as proof of his wife's "underground" activities and apparently hinted that his phone was also being tapped.

Even in that situation we still considered it more acceptable to use the Army in the capacity of "blue helmets" for separating the "White House" and the police. Up to the tragic events of 3-4 October Russia's people's deputies, the heads of Federation subjects and the leaders of trade unions and parties did not believe that the government could make a decision to storm the House of Soviets.

Unfortunately, independent experts with contacts with the President's administration and with the power structures maintained the opposite. The scenario had been worked out long before. According to Yeltsin, the "artillery preparation" was over. Only the actual storming remained. The date for it was postponed from one day to the next. The breakthrough of the blockade and the storming of important facilities (which ones was another question) had been set forth in the scenario and repeatedly approved. A game of nerves began.

Beginning on 22 September telegrams began coming in to the Supreme Soviet and to R. Khazbulatov personally from the military district commanders, in which they proposed a "zero option" and simultaneous, early elections for the President and the Supreme Soviet. This concept later became the basis of the negotiating process at the Saint Daniel Monastery. I also informed K. Kobets of this. The "zero option" demanded great courage of the authors of Decree No. 1400, however. After all, it actually involved rescinding it or suspending it if worse came to worst. We understood all of the political complexity involved in such a decision, particularly for B. Yeltsin and those around him, but we were hoping they would be sensible for the sake of Russia. Unfortunately, our hopes were not justified.

Representatives of the General Staff and of the military districts made their way to the Supreme Soviet, particularly in the first stage, who, like P. Deynkin, M. Kolesnikov and V. Mironov, declared that they understood the political situation, understood that an unconstitutional coup d'etat had been carried out but that they would not intervene yet but wait to see how events developed. Too many times the politicians had coerced the Army in the past and then abandoned and made scapegoats of the generals.

On Sunday night a group of officers from one of the units in the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District led by a colonel went over to the side of the parliament. In an interview with an Interfax correspondent inside the House of Soviets, the servicemen, who requested that they not be named, gave as the motive for their decision their absolute disagreement with B. Yeltsin's position. According to them, many other servicemen in their unit had also expressed a desire to go to the "White House", but the officers had not wanted to draw first-term servicemen into the conflict. The officers confirmed the fact that the Army was split but that it must defend the Constitution.

It was apparent that following promulgation of the 21 September decree and the execution of the coup d'etat, Yeltsin's team had seen that it did not have the necessary support either in Moscow or regionally. The Muscovites, who staged numerous demonstrations and rallies, were on the side of the House of Soviets. Consequently, the Army and its leadership would still have to be "broken." Only the excuse was needed, an act of great provocation. And this soon occurred: the "breakthrough" by Muscovites of the ring blockading the House of Soviets, the

"storming" of the mayor's office, "Ostankino." I underscore the fact: Those were acts of provocation.

"Everyone," A. Rutskoy said, "is drawing the Army to the 'White House.'"

"But then General K. Kobets promised to use it only in the capacity of 'blue helmets.'"

"I do not believe your Kobets or Grachev! They betrayed us once, and they will do it again. I was told," A. Rutskoy said, "that there is a split in the Ministry of Defense leadership over the use of the Army and its introduction into Moscow. Pashka is calling the divisions and regiments himself, over the heads of the commanders. And your beloved People's Deputy K. Kobets agreed to head an operational group to stabilize the situation in the city, which actually means firing upon the peaceful population. It is at his orders that aimed fire is being leveled against the House of Soviets."

Indeed, at a session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense held on the night of 3 October, a number of district commanders expressed their disagreement with the President's orders pertaining to supporting the status of the extraordinary situation in Moscow. All evening and all night from Sunday to Monday the President attempted to convince the generals of the need for a final assault on the House of Soviets. P. Grachev and K. Kobets did not need to be convinced; they agreed with it all.

What was A. Rutskoy to reply? We heard over a special radio unit that armored personnel carriers and personnel of the Kremlin and Tula airborne divisions had begun moving toward Moscow. Subunits of the Ryazan Airborne Division were being moved up.

We saw all of this at 07:00 on the morning of 4 October. Breaking through the barricades near the parliament building, five BMP penetrated to Free Russia Square and moved to the opposite side of the square. The armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles began shelling the barricades and tents and opened fire at windows in the House of Soviets. The first round razed a tent on the square with sleeping Muscovites inside. Three bodies were left lying on the street.

Subunits of the Tula Airborne Division, which had taken the place of the police and soldiers in the internal troops, closed the ring around the House of Soviets. At 08:30 the soldiers began approaching the building in bounds, while the armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles opened fire on the parliament building. Ten tanks from the Kantemir Division were moved onto the bridge and the opposite side of the Moscow River to provide fire support. After several volleys fire broke out on the 12th and 13th floor of the House of Soviets.

Over police radio R. Khazbulatov, Father Nikon and I constantly called upon the troops to cease fire and begin negotiations. The response was nothing but verbal abuse and a disinclination to engage in any sort of dialog. The

artillery fire intensified. The movement of troops, equipment and police forces in the direction of the House of Soviets increased by the hour. Reinforcements were constantly joining them. Most of the fire on the "White House" came from the direction of the American embassy, from the Hotel Mir and the quay near the Hotel Ukraina. Snipers plastered anything moving inside the "White House" from all sides.

A transition from a democratic regime to authoritarian rule had actually occurred in Russia. Tanks fired on the Supreme Soviet to the applause of world "civilization" and the approving yells of neo-democrats.

I phoned K. Kobets' headquarters once more. Colonel-General D. Volkogonov, people's deputy of the Russian Federation, picked up the phone. In a cold and steel-edged voice he told me:

"The situation has changed. The President has signed an order as Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the Minister of Defense on the storming of the House of Soviets and has assumed full responsibility. We shall quell the putsch at any cost. Army forces will establish order in Moscow.

When the people's deputies of Russia were led out of the House of Soviets and were standing on the central, marble staircase, many of them asked one another: "Why did they shell the 'White House' in such a ruthless, demonstrative and ostentatious manner"? So much has been written in the mass media on the possibility of taking such buildings with special-purpose forces and Alfa and Vypel subunits, without artillery or outside fire. All the more since Alfa leaders and Deputy Minister of Security V. Stepashin gave assurances that 30-40 minutes would be enough to take the building. We had experience: the capture of the royal palace in Kabul and the operations in Ossetia and Ingushetia. There were therefore other objectives. A scenario worked out long before was being played out.

All of us clearly understood that the shelling and the fire in the "White House" was an expensive show, a drama, staged on a grand scale for the West. "See, respected colleagues, how much work and bloodshed we have endured to achieve democracy and the opportunity to continue the political and economic reforms, while you keep waving promises in front of our faces but do not provide financial assistance. This is not gentlemanly!"

The writers of the scenario forgot, however, that the House of Soviets would remain in the mind of the population not just in Russia but in the entire former USSR as the champion of their interests, the interests of Russian-language citizens. The Russians remember well who has betrayed them and how many times.

Why are those who came to defend the Constitution and the law during those terrible days from the Dniester Region, the Baltic area and Central Asia regarded as butchers? By issuing the unconstitutional Decree No. 1400 on the coup d'etat and announcing that force would be used to break up the Supreme Soviet and the Congress

of People's Deputies, B. Yeltsin himself created all of the circumstances necessary for the arrival at the House of Soviets not just of the supporting mass of peaceable people with a certain political orientation but also people prepared to defend the Constitution and the parliament being dispersed, bearing weapons.

In the minds of the Russians the House of Soviets continues to represent the citadel of the Congress of PEOPLE'S (I particularly underscore that) Deputies. And the neo-democrats wanted very much to erase the memory of the Supreme Soviet from the minds of the people. In the minds of the Russians they were firing on their memories. It is not surprising that the government made haste in this matter as well. It adopted a decision to perform restoration work in the "White House" by November 1994 and to use the building as the center of government. History will hardly forget that no matter who is housed in that building, it is still the House of Soviets, that it was there that an act of vandalism was perpetrated in the public view, the shelling of Russia.

And now... the awarding of the order For Personal Valor to Army Gen Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, and Konstantin Ivanovich Kobets, deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, for valor and heroism exhibited in the suppression of armed attempts at a coup d'etat in Moscow on 3-4 October 1993. I am pained by the cynical use of the lofty words "valor" and "heroism" in this Decree. There is no such thing as heroes who fire upon the people.

Why Democrats Fear Army

94UM0215A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by Col A. Petrov under the rubric "The People's Army": "Why the Democrats Fear the Army"]

[Text]

Serve the Fatherland!

Television and the press are again vigorously raking the Army over the coals. This time for supporting Zhirnovskiy in the election. We already know that the "free, democratic press" does nothing without first clearing its actions with a certain center for the coordination of propaganda campaigns.

Why have certain sages among the democrats suddenly begun devoting so much attention to the army? Is it not because recent events have shown that democracy still lacks the strength to make a statement in internal affairs and some people are afraid it will make a statement on its own? Fear for their own skins put all the "zealots for the people" into a state of panic following the election.

Having despicably forced the Army to take part in the October bloodshed, the timeservers decided that they could treat the army like a prostitute. But no, despite the

participation by several units and formations in the unconstitutional putsch, the mood in the army as a whole did not become one of greater loyalty to the regime. On the contrary, there was a hatred in the Army for those who provoked it to commit bloodshed!

When speaking of the Army, it is impossible not to mention the participation of fightingmen in the execution of the legal authorities, a matter painful to the heart of every honorable officer and enlisted man. I am not in a position to make a legal assessment of the crime. This must be done at the official, state level by experienced legal experts. As an officer I am merely trying to understand the moral and ethical motivation of those who were forced (just that, forced—with the exception of a few scoundrels) to carry out the unconstitutional orders.

What was the core around which the entire life and the career of the Russian, a Russian officer, was based, structured and transpired? It was certainly not his earnings. There has never been a time in the history of Russia or the USSR when an officer received very high pay rates. Read the memoirs of the old Russian generals and other officers. Within our memory, in the "stagnant" past, the officer's pay was comparable to that of a skilled worker. And any merchant today receives many times the earnings of an officer. Furthermore, the former does not remain on duty day and night at a range, does not operate in a state of constant nervous tension in a missile silo or on a submarine or a missile-carrier, does not run forth in the face of bullets somewhere in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus. This means that it is not material benefit which has screened these people but a strength commensurate with the difficulties and dangers. Russian historian L.N. Gumilev defined it as "zeal."

As applied to the officer, it is a desire to realize his vital aspirations in the military, in service to the state and the people. It was precisely an orientation toward the state which constituted the dominant imperative in the shaping of the officers' world outlook. Beginning at the end of the '80s, however, this core first lost its stability and then, with the collapse of the Union, became an ephemeral element. The most unstable, career-minded, essentially marginal portion of the officer corps set out on a course openly betraying their duty, the army and the state. One need only to recall the exposure of commercial activities being engaged in by higher command personnel in the Western Group of Forces, in certain fleets, in the aviation and the districts.

I feel that this development has had an extremely demoralizing effect upon the army, possibly even greater than when the Gorbachev government betrayed the army in Tbilisi and Vilnius; greater than the dirty, vile campaign in which democratized elements in the mass media accused the army of all the sins of the universe.

The force of cultivated traditions is so great, however, that even in today's extremely difficult circumstances the large part of the officer corps continue conscientiously to bear their cross.

It was precisely the reflexive force of discipline which forced most of those officers who entered Moscow bearing weapons to submit to the unconstitutional orders, since the orders emanated from those groups to which the army is subordinate, the state leadership. Habit is second nature.

The fact that the introduction of troops into Moscow was effected with typically authoritarian methods also played a role. General Kondratyev, deputy defense minister, issued orders directly to the commanders of the 2nd and 4th divisions and the 27th brigade (I deliberately and for perfectly understandable reasons omit the word "Guards" in their names). Furthermore, commanders at all levels were forbidden to give any information to staff members of the district, which was not informed of the introduction of subordinate troops into Moscow. The ban was lifted only after the defenders of the parliament were suppressed. How do you like that? The leadership of the Ministry of Defense does not even trust the district command element and its staff? We can see that fear predominates in the sentiments of the upper level even there. Fear forced the Ministry of Security to be destroyed, but since the Army cannot be treated that way, we should anticipate some personnel changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the districts, primarily the Moscow district.

With respect to the prestige of leaders of the state and the Army in the military, its value is vanishingly small, as the mathematicians say. The October events turned against Yeltsin even those few officers who still harbored certain illusions about him. The most unfortunate thing is the fact that none of the prominent military leaders, either of the present or from the past, enjoys absolute or even predominant prestige among the officers.

And so, the following conclusions can be drawn:

that the Army as a special institution of the state is presently incapable of performing its main function, with the exception of the nuclear forces;

that the Army is still capable of exerting a major influence upon the outcome of events inside the country; and that its role can be either fatal or rejuvenating;

that the Army in the person of its officer corps absolutely rejects the present regime;

that the Army is not yet a unified, unequivocally like-minded organism; it has not acquired a leader, and this is a major destabilizing factor.

One can predict events to come. There is no doubt that a narrow group of rulers will continue to implement "their" plan for subordinating the nation to the West, no matter what the cost. Resistance in the people to this course is great and continues to grow. Support for the regime will be sought in so-called power structures. The Ministry of Security was destroyed, and for some time these agencies will not have the capacity seriously to influence the situation. The army's antipathy toward the

regime is indisputable, but the inertia of subordination is still great. Only the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is capable of providing support, a fact demonstrated by past events. It is with good reason that this ministry's strength is presently being vigorously built up. More than 20 percent of the draftees within the MVO [Moscow Military District] are destined for the MVD. This is an unprecedented figure.

Considering the inconsistent position taken by the Army (not to be confused with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense), state-minded, patriotic forces, organizations and leaders should interact more closely with the officer corps. In no case should we repeat the errors of the past, when it was taken for granted that the army would refuse to employ weapons, and based on those groundless hopes almost no work was performed with it. The fuss raised by certain officer organizations found the bulk of the officer corps indifferent. The main stress in working with the army should be on appealing to its state-oriented, patriotic instinct. The origins of most officers in the people and their basic linkage with the people should be stressed to the maximum—not an abstract but a concrete people gasping from the current difficulties but still supporting the army which betrayed it in October of '93. We need to promote constantly, persistently and purposefully the concept that a Russian, a Russian officer, if he is a real officer, is incapable of lifting a hand against a compatriot or against legal authority.

GROUND TROOPS

'Gyurza' 9-mm Pistol

94UM02294 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "The 'Gyurza' Has a Stern Nature"]

[Text] In a recent article, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA discussed the equipment and arms exhibition in Turkey. Special attention was devoted to the "small-arms" section presented by Russia. Besides similar models, you mentioned the "Gyurza" 9-mm pistol set. Could you discuss this weapon in more detail?

Aleksandr Vlasov

Krasnodar

Despite the modest dimensions and limited combat significance of this type of weapon, the history of the pistol is the history of the dramatic struggle of a designer's idea and the capabilities of the technology. Frankly speaking, until recently there hasn't been an ideal pistol in the world. There were simply successful and popular models: the Browning, the Mauser, the Colt,

the TT [Tokarev Tula pistol]... But, based upon the big picture, they remained a weak weapon of destruction. Small weapons are acquiring force only right now. The pistol that we are discussing today is actually a powerful weapon that meets very high combat requirements.

They named it "Gyurza" [Persian—gurza—a type of poisonous snake], probably because there is little chance of pulling through after a "bite". As Mauser the younger once said, inventor and State Prize Laureate Petr Serdyukov, in cooperation with Aleksey Yuryev (the cartridge designer), managed to accommodate so much death and force in the space called "Gyurza" that the pistol can legitimately be considered to be one of the best, if not the best, in its class. But let's let the technical specifications speak for themselves.

Tactical-Technical Specifications of the "Gyurza" Pistol Set

Length, mm	195
Height, mm	145
Thickness, mm	30
Weight without cartridges, grams	995
Capacity of the magazines	2 X 18
Caliber, mm	9
Bullet muzzle velocity, m/s	420
Combat rate of fire, cartridges per minute	up to 40

One of the main specifications is effective firing range. For "Gyurza", it is 100 meters (as we know, the PM [9 mm pistol designed by Makarov] has a range of 25 meters). It is from this distance that the pistol permits us to destroy an enemy who is protected by a helmet. At a range of up to 70 meters, "Gyurza's" bullet pierces a flak jacket (two titanium plates 1.2 mm thick each and 30 layers of Kevlar). No other pistol is capable of doing that today.

"Gyurza" is equipped with two automatic safeties which is an innovation. One is located on the trigger (a pin that depresses when squeezed) and the other is on the handle. The safeties are turned off when the pistol is grasped properly by a hand, thereby excluding the possibility of delays when opening fire that are characteristic for a standard pistol and which are associated with a forward safety in the fighting position, or the possibility of the pistol becoming stuck in the holster, caught on clothing, etc.

The new pistol permits you to conduct fire when the hammer is placed in the fully cocked position.

There is a horn, a bend in the trigger guard, or, as they call it here, a support for the other hand. That is also an innovation that facilitates firing the powerful pistol. However, experience has shown that firing the "Gyurza"

one-handed is also adequately effective. A pistol shooter with a medium level of training hits a full-length target no less than 16 of 18 possible times at a range of 100 meters.

It remains to be added that the pistol was developed at the Central NII of Precision Machinebuilding and is entering the inventory of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] special subunits.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

List of Aviation Schools, Specialties

94UM0231A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Feb 94 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Advertisement for Those Who Are Selecting Military Aviation"]

[Text]

Military Educational Institution	Specialty	Skill
Military-Air Engineering Academy imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy, 40 Leningradskiy Prospekt, Moscow-167, 125167	aircraft and power plants	mechanical engineer-researcher
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer-researcher
	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer-researcher
	automated control systems	electrical equipment engineer-researcher
	aircraft avionics	radio engineer-researcher
Flight Schools		
Balashov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, Saratov Oblast, Balashov-3, 412340	military transport aircraft pilot	pilot-engineer
Barnaul Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, Altay Kray, Barnaul-18, 656018	fighter-bomber aircraft pilot	pilot-engineer
Kachinskii Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, Volgograd-10, 400010	fighter aircraft pilot	pilot-engineer
Tambov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, Tambov-4, 192004	bomber aircraft pilot	pilot-engineer
Navigation Schools		
Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Navigators, Chelyabinsk-15, 450015	navigator (for all services and branches of aviation)	navigator-engineer
A Branch of Kachinskii Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, Krasnodar Kray, Yeysk-7, 353660	air traffic control officer	air traffic control engineer
Engineering Schools		
Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, Voronezh-64, 394064	motor vehicle	special motor vehicle operations engineer
	aviation rear services support	airfield-technical system operations engineer
	airfield-technical support systems	electrical engineer
	building power systems	electrical engineer
	meteorology	engineer-meteorologist
Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, Irkutsk-36, 664036	aircraft and power plants	mechanical engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer
	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer
	avionics	radio engineer
Tambov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, Tambov-6, 392006	aircraft radio systems	radio engineer
	automated control systems	electrical equipment engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer
Aviation-Technical Schools		
Achinsk Military Aviation-Technical School, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Achinsk-1, 662100	aircraft and aircraft engines	mechanical engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer

Military Educational Institution	Specialty	Skill
Kirov Military Aviation-Technical School, Kirov-41, 610041	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer
	avionics	radio engineer
	helicopters and aircraft engines	mechanical engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer
Krasnodar Higher Combined Flight-Technical School, Krasnodar-5, 350003	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer
	avionics	radio engineer
	aircraft and aircraft engines	mechanical engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer
Kurgan Military Aviation-Technical School, Kurgan-16, 640016	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer
	electronic systems	radio engineer
	aircraft and aircraft engines	mechanical engineer
	avionics	radio engineer
Perm Military Aviation-Technical School, Perm-49, 614049	aircraft and aircraft engines	mechanical engineer
	aircraft weapons	electrical engineer
	aircraft equipment	electrical engineer
	avionics	radio engineer

NAVAL FORCES

Industry Chief Bemoans Naval Construction Halt

PM1102200194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Feb 94 pp 1, 2

["Topical interview" with Gennadiy Voronin, chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, by Vladimir Gundarov; date and place not given: "Russia's Naval Prestige Bound To Sink Below 'Red' Line"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Gennadiy Petrovich Voronin is an academician of the International Engineering Academy, a doctor of economical sciences, a member of the British Institute of Naval Engineers, an honored machine builder of Russia, and a State Prize winner. He is deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, you have devoted all your life to shipbuilding and you are well acquainted with all the stages of boom and decline in the Russian Navy's history. In your opinion what kind of stage is it going through now?

[Voronin] A stage of decline, of course. It takes time to do what we have to do to overcome this stage in accordance with the new military doctrine—with smaller numbers but higher quality, as the saying goes. But so far there has not been enough time for the Navy to acquire new qualities, that is for it to obtain new, high-precision weapons, more modern ships and command and control

systems, and so on. Speaking in broad terms, we currently have no military equipment program, whereas in the past we had plans for 10-15 years in advance.

[Gundarov] Just how long do we still have to wait?

[Voronin] We have been waiting for a program for over 18 months. It has now been finalized and signed, but it is not yet an official document which could be sent to our plants. I think it will be approved in the first quarter of this year. But the program is not dogma. Obviously it will still be subject to amendment, hopefully in the direction of increasing the fleet's combat strength.

[Gundarov] The press has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the current reduction in the number of Navy ships is the consequence not only of the USSR's geopolitical disintegration and the economic crisis in Russia, but also of mistakes made in drawing up the preceding shipbuilding programs....

[Voronin] Everything can be doubted and criticized with the benefit of hindsight. For example many people say that we should not have built aircraft carriers; they say it was too expensive. But what is cheap? At that historical stage, given the military doctrine and given the confrontation with NATO and in particular with the United States, our shipbuilding program designed to take us through the year 2000 was, I believe, correct. It was elaborated and approved at collegiums of various ministries: defense, shipbuilding, and others.

I do not deny that mistakes are made in any business. We sometimes philosophize that everything should be decided collectively—by some kind of oblast committees, soviets, or collegiums. Nevertheless the role of the

individual will, I think, always influence specific decisions. Recently I went to America and England and saw how things are done there. There the role of the individual, judging by what happens, is simply staggering. Although outwardly it is less noticeable, maybe because everyone there has more freedom.

[Gundarov] We are now in Russia, where there have always been people with a preference for certain types of ship. So it would be interesting to find out which ships you have a preference for.

[Voronin] I have a preference for the Navy as a whole. I have carefully studied U.S. naval doctrine. By the year 2000 their combat effectiveness will have increased 100 percent. Not through the number of ships but through the quality of new weapons and power-generating systems, in short, through science. Everything there is resolved in a comprehensive manner. At the same time it should be noted that many countries have decided to build small aircraft carriers designed to take 15-20 Harrier-type aircraft. I believe that we too should have these aircraft carriers in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. They could be built in St. Petersburg or Severodvinsk. We have the stocks on which to do that.

But I am concerned by what the Americans are doing now while we are doing nothing. We have started work to salvage old ships and submarines. While the United States is practically ceasing its involvement in salvaging and is converting old ships into training ships. A ship can be made ready for combat again within a month or two.

[Gundarov] Do you yourself believe that?

[Voronin] Generally it is hard to believe in something 100 percent. But I know that the work is being done. I do not think that they will be able to convert all old ships into training ships, but here we often write off even quite new ships for scrap.

[Gundarov] For example, the aircraft carrying cruiser Kiev?

[Voronin] Its fate has still not been decided, but it is predetermined.

[Gundarov] Why can we not take the same road as the Americans?

[Voronin] We are probably prevented from doing so by a kind of "special Russian genotype." All the time we are trying to make economies without investing money in anything. In two years we have not built a single surface ship. But the problem of repairing old ships is not being solved either. So far only the salvaging of submarines has been "stoked up" because ship-repair plants, which have no other orders at present, have clutched at this work like a straw.

[Gundarov] What is in store for the Navy in the near future?

[Voronin] We have worked out a program through 2003 in which we have taken account of the new military doctrine's demands. The program is based above all on the real situation in industry. Every plant has a so-called "red" technological line below which the plant must not go, in order to prevent the disintegration of production sectors. The illogical thing is that conversion has proceeded apace, that is, it has been several times greater than that originally planned. For example, we have enterprises where the main production decreased 80 percent in one year. In this situation no economic formula works any more. That is why, when elaborating the economic program, we took as our basis the task of maintaining production. But even our minimal program, it turned out, costs four times as much as the budget available to the Defense Ministry. I know that the Defense Ministry is currently battling with the Finance and Economy Ministries. To avoid a total collapse we have been forced to take a risk: To put new systems, instruments, and units into production without having official documents for doing so.

[Gundarov] Are you not afraid that in five years or so people will at best start criticizing you for building ships without a program and therefore for making more mistakes?

[Voronin] There is something else that we have to fear: Being accused of doing nothing. After all, science cannot be stopped, but what we are doing is not essential. We know how and on what a potential enemy is working, how a process is proceeding throughout the world, and what new systems, component base, and new technologies are being developed. Of course, we too are compelled to carry out this work, but, it turns out, with our eyes shut.

[Gundarov] Still, is it not easier to work with our eyes open, even if on a minimal program?

[Voronin] I do not want to reveal all our secrets. I will merely note that an enterprise which has been able to get into a foreign market and make a dollar profit uses it not for its own social needs but for finding solutions to state tasks, including scientific developments. We are hard-put to compete with the Japanese, who already have the fifth generation of radio electronics in production—molecular electronics and biocomputers. But should we not at least keep our finger on the pulse? Irrespective of whether the new parliament gives money or not. That is life.

[Gundarov] At the moment Russia has no enemies, politicians claim. Maybe the need to build new ships intensively has also ceased?

[Voronin] Sometimes I am asked a simple "peasant" question: Why can U.S. submarines dart around Severodvinsk while we cannot do the same near their country? Moreover, the opposing side refuses to hold any talks on cutting naval forces, considering itself a great naval power and guarantor of peace. Not only the United States is looking after its fleet. Work to build up China's

naval forces has now been launched as never before. Hundreds of representatives of various firms and departments in that country are coming to us. I have met many of them and formed the conclusion that they have set themselves the task of making their country one of the most powerful naval powers in the near future. Recently I visited South Korea, where I met the president of the "Khala" [as transliterated] firm. In 18 months they intend to construct a new state-of-the-art shipyard. South Korea is currently the world's second biggest shipbuilder and will probably soon be the biggest. Even that small country intends to begin building submarines—diesel submarines for the time being. While China is already interested in nuclear-powered submarines. Those two countries' strategy is to invest colossal amounts of money in their own naval forces. We have already sensed this during business contacts.

[Gundarov] Do you notice a desire on the part of our government to maintain Russia's naval might?

[Voronin]) No. In our country, as is often the case, words are at variance with actions. Judging from the state orders which shipbuilders now have, our main customer is foreign rather than our Defense Ministry: Forty percent of domestic shipyards' capacities are starting to work for the West.

[Gundarov] In that case, what awaits the industrial complex which works for the Russian Navy?

[Voronin] We are waiting for the state to settle accounts with shipbuilders. I will cite just one figure. The state owes the "Sevmash" production association 130 billion rubles. For several months we have been promised that this money would be paid, but the debt has not yet been cleared. Hence the enterprise has no circulating capital and the production chain is being destroyed. In short, all this is a string of truisms about which a considerable amount has already been said.

[Gundarov] Do you have specific proposals as to how to maintain production?

[Voronin] The matter is complicated by the fact that, on the one hand, conversion programs apparently exist but, on the other, they are not being implemented because finance for them is lacking. Therefore we are not elaborating proposals but specific subprograms for every plant. They do not have to choose right now. They are getting to work fulfilling any orders: Whether they be for peasants, oil or gas industry workers, or along ecological lines.

[Gundarov] And at the same time shipbuilding technology is being destroyed?

[Voronin] Yes, from the viewpoint of shipbuilding construction we are, of course, losing out.

[Gundarov] Maybe this is a consequence of the fact that there is no Navy lobby in the government?

[Voronin] To some extent I agree with you. There are many lobbyists of various persuasions. But as far as the Navy goes I do not see its lobbyists. Yuriy Yarov has a better grasp of the Navy's problems than others in the government. But unfortunately he is engaged in resolving other questions. But I do not sense in certain other people who have reached the crucible of power any understanding of the tasks facing the production complex, which in particular provides for the Navy's needs. This occurs because these people have not passed through the plant school. The moment has now come when nobody wants to hear the exhortations of practical people, and they themselves are called antireformists. But practical people would not have made the colossal mistakes we are now observing in the management of industry. The problem of cadres, I believe, is now the most pressing. Incidentally, I am for reforms, but they must be carried out in a more evolutionary way.

[Gundarov] What would you do first of all if the situation in which the Navy found itself depended entirely on you?

[Voronin] It is just the same as asking a mechanic at a technical servicing center what he would do first of all with a broken machine. First he would probably have a look at it. If we start at the beginning, I am convinced that industry could withstand 5 percent or a maximum of 10 percent conversion. Foreign experience demonstrates this. As conversion increases the production process becomes unmanageable, because it comes into conflict with science and economics. It is therefore hard to say what should be done first of all when everything has disintegrated.

Wars are raging all over the world. The situation in the Near East is complex, and it is becoming acute in Asia. The brake has been taken off the U.S. Navy. I think I would review the shipbuilding program and adopt a more careful attitude to reducing it. Obsolete ships, which are not combat-effective in a modern war, can be cut. But in fact we are cutting ships which have been in service only 15 years instead of 25.

Second, whether we like it or not, plants must not be allowed to fall below the "red" line. Otherwise no edicts or orders will save production from collapsing.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, in ending our conversation, what would you—the man who is building the Navy—like to wish the Navy's sailors in the new year of 1994?

[Voronin] It is hard to find more optimistic people, although figuratively speaking they have to "fight" every day: When cruising, on combat service, or on alert status. I would like to wish that their optimism never deserts them. I am convinced that better times are ahead for the Navy, because we have a demonstrable trump card enabling us to be a naval power. And no political battles can take it away from us.

Two Pacific Fleet Submersibles Out of Commission

94UM0230B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Andrey Gavrilenko under the rubric "The Society": "Dangerous Depth: Pacific Fleet Divers Sending Out SOS"]

[Text] Vladivostok—

They Are Hurting

The last time they rescued people was in June of 1983. A submarine had had an accident and sunk to a great depth. More than 100 men were sealed in at the bottom of the ocean. Deep-sea divers came to their rescue. The rescue operation, which lasted several days, was successful...

Until the end of the 1980's two deep-sea diving systems (GVK) operated in the Pacific Fleet. These unique units made it possible to find and rescue crews of submarines involved in accidents at depths of more than 300 meters. The first was installed on the submarine Komsomolets Uzbekistana, the second on the search-and-rescue vessel Alagez.

For more than two years now, however, both diving units have been undergoing put-off repair work, and the fleet does not have the money to complete them. The scariest thing is the fact that if, God forbid, a submarine should be involved in an accident such as the one which occurred in 1983, no one would be able to help the crew.

According to Capt 1st Rank Aleksandr Peremet, chief of the section for search-and-rescue support and combat training, the situation has repeatedly been reported to the TOF [Pacific Fleet] commander, the commander in chief of the VMF [Navy] and even the President of Russia. No specific decisions have yet been made on this urgent matter, however.

Capt 3rd Rank Sergey Salin, senior diving specialist for the Pacific Fleet, told me that his subordinates are presently engaged only in minor servicing of ships and vessels in the area of the base. And all because the diving equipment of Pacific Fleet personnel lags at least 30-40 years behind that of the Europeans. It is not just difficult but actually dangerous to use the equipment. Two divers have died in the fleet in the past year. Three others have suffered serious injuries. Osteochondrosis is an occupational disease of the diver. One out of two "conquerors of the deep" suffers from it.

There is worse. The latest training aid for divers dates back to 1962. The seamen learn the specialties of "underwater detonation specialist" and "underwater welder" from aids going all the way back to 1956.

The manning level for seamen-divers in the fleet (albeit this is of somewhat secondary importance; the personnel problem is the same throughout) does not exceed 35 percent. Nor are there enough civilian specialists,

because their salaries in the Far East Shipping Line is greater than that of fleet personnel by a factor of 1.5-2.

There is one other factor, which clearly needs to be considered on the legislative level. As a result of the constant psychological and physical stress, the people who dedicate their lives to diving rapidly "wear out" and age. The fleet's medical specialists believe that the maximum age for deep diving is 40 years. After the age of 40 deep diving is absolutely counterindicated. Lack of any kind of benefits, however, prevents the divers from retiring earlier than Moscow's trolleybus operators.

Unfortunately, this is far from all the problems faced by Pacific Fleet personnel at a dangerous depth. The Pacific Fleet could find itself in the near future with no one to dive. And the deep-sea rescue divers must therefore be rescued themselves.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Wages, Social Protection of Civilian Defense Workers

94UM0200A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, 1993 pp 3-7

[Major-General V. Rudik, chief of the Civilian Defense Workers Directorate, interviewed by Colonel Anatoliy Yurkin (res): "Urgent Topic: Civilian Personnel of Russian Federation Armed Forces—Wages and Social Protection"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Defense Minister's Order No. 130, "On Introducing New Wage Terms for Civilian Personnel of Troop Units, Institutions, Military Educational Institutions, and Budget-Financed Enterprises and Organizations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense on the Basis of a Uniform Wage Scale [UWS]," significantly improves social protection for civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces and is becoming a tangible incentive.

Major-General V. Rudik, chief of the Civilian Personnel Labor and Wages Directorate of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, tells about the procedure for introducing the new wage terms based on the Uniform Wage Scale (UWS) and the tasks involved in accomplishing this important work.

[Yurkin] The introduction of new wage terms affects the vital interests of employees of the entire national-economic budget sphere and the civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces. However, before talking about the innovations, Viktor Antonovich, it seems that we should first discuss, if only briefly, the background of this issue. Many ask why the introduction of the UWS was necessary and whether it is in keeping with the Russian Federation Labor Law Code.

[Rudik] Let's start from the beginning: The socioeconomic situation that obtained at the end of last year caused a sharp change in traditional wage policy. A significant wage gap arose between the production and nonproduction spheres.

After prices were liberalized, members of certain branches (miners, air-traffic controllers) used various methods to obtain appreciable advantages, causing even greater tension in society. The question of social justice and compliance with the requirements of Article Two of the Russian Federation Labor Law Code arose with special urgency. Let me remind you what that article says: "Every worker has the right to equal compensation for equal work, without any discrimination and not below the legally prescribed minimum amount." This in turn led to Russian Federation government Decree No. 785, whose purpose is to regulate wage rates for various branches and to establish substantiated wage ratios for workers depending on complexity and skill levels and based on the use of the UWS.

Just what is the UWS? It is a uniform scale of wage rates and grade-based wages for workers and office employees. It encompasses all budget sphere workers and provides for wage differentiation among 18 grades. The wage scale for workers has eight grades. In contrast to analogous workers in the national economy, the Russian Federation government decree sets increases in wage rates of up to 50 percent for categories of civilian personnel and for various types of work, as well as a schedule of additional payments, compensation payments, and wage and salary raises linked to the particular features of military units' activities.

[Yurkin] Who has been given advantages in terms of the amounts of wage and salary increases? Won't workers' rights be infringed upon?

[Rudik] No, they will not. The wage rates (including the increases of up to 50 percent) have been increased first and foremost for workers, who had no grounds to complain about their pay earlier. This applies to tool-makers, a wide range of machine tool operators, and tool-setters who work with unique equipment. This category also includes loggers, divers, topographers and geodesists, district power grid specialists, and several others.

The maximum wage increase of 50 percent is being introduced for all UWS grade one workers, as well as for certain categories of physicians and middle- and junior-level medical personnel. Wage rates are being increased by 40 percent for all workers on whom UWS grade two is conferred, such as drivers, road and railroad repairmen, utility repairmen, and workers who specialize in construction repairs. I could continue this list, but the point of the changes lies in that the differentiated wage increases were also prompted by an adverse personnel situation. For example, certain garrisons in the Far East and the Transbaykal region in effect have no workers to

operate their utility systems. For this reason, the introduction of the UWS provides wage increases for workers that are more substantial, and in a number of cases higher, than those for degree-holding specialists, such as engineers, economists, and even directors of structural divisions.

[Yurkin] Many readers might immediately ask about the procedure that will be used to confer grades on workers. Who will do this?

[Rudik] That is a rather complex question, but I will give an intelligible answer to it. First of all, enterprise and organization workers whose pay was based on hourly wage rates will be subject to the previous procedure for conferring grades one through eight, which conform to the UWS wage categories. The Russian defense minister's order directs that skill categories are to be conferred on workers who did not have them previously. For example, guards, office cleaning women, film projectionists, and park landscapers. This also applies to boiler operators and dry cleaning and laundry workers. Military units also have other worker occupations for which a specific wage category is not conferred but rather set by the commanding officer. He takes into account the difficulty, service norms, and other parameters of the job in question.

Grades nine and 10 can be set for highly skilled workers employed in important and responsible jobs. I should point out that this norm should not be viewed as a chance to establish wage rates for worker occupations in grades nine and 10, but only as a chance to pay them wages based on the rates set for these grades. These wages need not necessarily be of a permanent character.

The introduction of the UWS does not require that workers be assigned new wage categories, as a rule. They are simply given the new wage in keeping with the grade already conferred on them or set for them by the commanding officer, and an entry is made to this effect in their labor record booklets.

Military unit commanders are also permitted to introduce labor organization and wage methods and systems (temporary, piece-rate, brigade, etc.) when concluding collective contracts within the scope of the confirmed wage fund.

[Yurkin] Let's hope, Viktor Antonovich, that the gist of your explanations will be clear to workers reading this. The important thing is that they are going to start earning more money by exhibiting diligence and discipline. Will the social rights of directors and specialists and of our intelligentsia be safeguarded just as thoroughly?

[Rudik] I see no reason for concern, since wage procedures and terms for that category of civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces have been set for all budget branches, regardless of place of work. For example, economists will have wage scales in the range of grades six through 11, chief specialists, 13 through 17, and

office managers, four and five. In view of the heightened social responsibility and the creative character of the work of employees in public education, higher education, public health, and science, their wage rates have been set at one to four grades higher than those for general specialists. For example, while engineers in various specialties have wage rates at grades six through 11, teachers and doctors will have wage rates at grades seven through 14 and grades eight through 15, respectively.

For many specialist positions, skill requirements entail dual grades within the framework of the corresponding category. For example, a category-two production engineer comes under grades nine and 10. This is due to rather significant differences in the level of difficulty, diversity and importance of their official duties. Taking this approach to setting grades for military unit commanders (based on the decisions of certification commissions) makes it possible to effectively resolve wage rate issues in specific circumstances.

The wage rates for top officials and directors of institutions, organizations, and enterprises fall within grades nine through 18, as a rule. They are differentiated on the basis of complexity of administrative functions and their social responsibility. Salary rates for deputy directors and chief accountants are set 10 to 20 percent, and for assistant directors 30 to 40 percent, below the salary of the corresponding director. The amount by which the salary is reduced is set at any percentage from the minimum to the maximum amount established for the deputy, assistant director, or chief accountant. As in the case of specialists, wages for this category will be based on the findings of special certification procedures.

[Yurkin] What determines wage amounts for enterprise, institution, and organization directors?

[Rudik] The group of the enterprise, institution, or organization. Military units and formations, for example, are divided into four groups. This division is a forced one. You will agree that managing a corps and managing a division are by no means one and the same thing. It is hardly fair if a 1,500-bed hospital pays the same wage as a hospital with just 200 beds. The criteria for assigning plants, arsenals, bases, warehouses, repair shops, print shops, and a number of other enterprises and organizations to the various groups are performance indices in physical terms and the established number of workers. When work-force tables are registered and audits and checks are performed, a check is made to see that the director has been assigned to the correct wage group.

[Yurkin] Will wage terms and, in particular, above-wage amounts change with the introduction of the UWS?

[Rudik] In contrast to the national economy, the introduction of the UWS for civilian employees of the Russian Armed Forces entails significant changes in this form of wages.

In shifting to the new wage terms based on the UWS, military unit commanders are authorized, when concluding collective contracts and within the scope of their approved wage funds, to agree to salary raises, to set additional payments over and above the wage rates, and to pay additional pay of a compensation character. For the first time, additional pay has been introduced for combat alert duty and for working in rural areas.

The main types of additional pay of a compensation character are provided to directors, specialists, and technical performance personnel who know foreign languages and use them in their daily work and to motor vehicle drivers with skill ratings. The defense minister's order takes into account all special features of the work of branch employees and categories of civilian personnel and establishes various types of salary raises and additional pay.

In my opinion, the new system for paying percentage-based increases for uninterrupted service merits special attention.

[Yurkin] Needless to say, we are dealing with an urgent problem that concerns a lot of people. Could you spell out what the innovations being introduced will basically mean, so that readers of our journal who work in military units and at Ministry of Defense organizations and enterprises can quickly calculate their wages?

[Rudik] Let me begin with the most important point: The amount of the percentage-based additional pay for uninterrupted service has been substantially increased and is now equal to that of an officer for years of service. This innovation was introduced in order to stabilize cadres and to give civilian personnel a greater material incentive to amass uninterrupted work time in military units and to increase their wages. The following additional pay for uninterrupted service, as a percentage of the wage rate for basic occupation, has been established: more than one year, five percent; more than two years, 10 percent; more than three years, 15 percent; more than five years, 20 percent; more than 10 years, 25 percent; more than 15 years, 30 percent; and more than 20 years, 40 percent. It should now be easy to make the calculations with a pencil.

The procedure for calculating length of uninterrupted service for servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or have retired on account of age, sickness, personnel cutbacks, or health limitations has been changed, and rightly so. Their total length of uninterrupted service conferring the right to receive percentage-based additional pay for such service now includes their entire period of military service. True, on one condition: That they began working in the military unit within one year of the date of discharge from military service, and, with respect to employees discharged on account of disability, excluding the time of a group one or group two disability. This period used to be six months.

The question of including military service in the Armed Forces of the states that used to be former Soviet union

republics has also been solved in a positive fashion, provided that the person began working in the military unit within one year of the date on which he was discharged into the reserves or retired on those same grounds. Given current migration processes, this measure will undoubtedly help many people make important decisions about their future, relying on the help of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

[Yurkin] The social orientation of many Russian Federation laws relating to our Armed Forces is clear. Does the introduction of the UWS give broader rights to unit commanders in providing incentives for conscientious service?

[Rudik] The rights of commanders are undoubtedly broadened. With the consent of elective trade union agencies, each year military unit commanders approve a material incentive and material assistance fund in an amount of up to six monthly wage funds (based on a one-year period). How will this money be used? First and foremost, to pay bonuses for basic performance on a monthly and quarterly basis and to make additional incentive payments. For example, for completing especially important, urgent tasks and to reward employees for annual performance results—the so-called 13th paycheck.

The following provision is also new: Monies in this fund may be used to reimburse workers for meals and the cost of commuting on urban public transport and to make other payments of a social character stipulated in a collective contract. The latter is the legal foundation regulating all material incentive matters. Bonuses, additional pay, rewards, and material assistance paid to an individual employee are not limited by any maximum ceilings; however, total payments to all workers in the course of one year must not exceed six monthly wage funds (based on a one-year period). Money saved from monthly wage funds may not be used for these purposes.

[Yurkin] Viktor Antonovich, let me make a proposal: Let's look at incentive factors on a somewhat different plane. You will agree that it's one thing to live and work in Russia's central regions, and quite another in Siberia and the Far North. Are any compensation measures provided for Northerners, Siberians, Far Easterners, and people in the Transbaykal region?

[Rudik] I can assure you that the approach to setting regional coefficients, the subject of your question, has been fundamentally changed. Everyone was fed up with the discrepancies that existed earlier. For example, a 1.30 coefficient was set for military units in Nizhneilimskiy and Bratsk Rayons, Irkutsk Province, but a 1.40 coefficient for loggers. This sort of social discrimination against civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces was also to be observed in Okhotsk District, Khabarovsk Kray. These discrepancies have now been eliminated.

The Ministry of Defense has been authorized to apply regional coefficients to the wages of civilian personnel

within the scope of the coefficients set for a corresponding region, including those set by local agencies. For this reason, Order No. 130 of the Russian Federation defense minister establishes uniform regional coefficients for civilian personnel of military units, institutions, enterprises, and organizations in the corresponding regions.

The introduction of the UWS entails a shift to the interbranch wage organization principle. This means that in fields of Defense Ministry activity, equal pay for equal work is being introduced for employees in equivalent occupations. At the same time, special features of the work of employees in various branches are taken into account in setting wage terms. This is reflected in defense minister Order No. 130 that I mentioned.

[Yurkin] If we are going to discuss special wage arrangements, I suggest that we start with military educational institutions.

[Rudik] This section of the order deals with wage terms not only for higher educational establishment employees, but also for employees of general-education institutions, such as schools, kindergartens, and extracurricular and military educational establishments.

For professor and instructor positions, skill requirements call for experience in research, research-and-teaching, or practical work, which must be reflected in the employee's labor record booklet.

The procedure for paying for teaching work over and above established workload norms (including when an employee is substituting for an instructor who is temporarily absent) has been changed. An employee may hold a second job at up to 50 percent time, in either his own or another department, it makes no difference. On the whole, the innovations will result in a increase 3-4 times for the salaries for educators in comparison with November 1992, and increase of 3.5-5 times for educational institution directors.

We also have another category of civilian employees whose wages have prompted many questions. It is medical and pharmacy employees. There will be no special certifications in introducing the new wage terms. Under the wage scale system, their pay grades will be based on the position they hold, the skill category conferred on them, whether they hold any academic ranks or honorary titles, and their place of work.

Physician specialists at rest and relaxation facilities, preventive-care facilities, boarding houses, tourist centers, sports schools and facilities, general-education schools, and preschool and extracurricular institutions will be assigned to UWS wage grade nine, regardless of their skill categories.

Medical and pharmacy employees who manage their departments and are candidates of sciences; physicians

who serve as chairmen of military physician commissions and medical flight commissions; directors of military medical institutions who have a skill category; and physicians who have the honorary title "Meritorious Physician" are to be assigned a pay grade that is one grade higher than that of persons who do not have these distinctions. I repeat: only one grade higher, not two grades, one for being a manager and one for the honorary title.

[Yurkin] Are there no exceptions?

[Rudik] The rule is this: People who are entitled to increase their pay grades by one or two grades on the basis of several factors may take one pay grade increase based on the most compelling grounds. And now as regards exceptions: The UWS pay grades may be raised by two grades for physicians and for certified pharmacists who manage their military medical institutions and who have the highest skill rating, and for doctors of science and physicians who hold the honorary title "People's Physician."

I should also call attention to the following features: Military hospitals and sanatoriums, as well as outpatient polyclinics that include diagnostic centers, have been raised to the next highest grade with respect to wages for their directors. In addition, in contrast to the previous procedure, salaries for civilian personnel who work in hazardous and especially difficult conditions are being raised not only for employees of military medical institutions, but also for employees who are enlisted to provide consultation, medical care, and other services. The salary increases for these employees are based on the actual amount of time they work under the aforementioned conditions.

[Yurkin] How will wages for cultural workers change? In the library, Margarita Petrovna complained to me that she had worked her entire life for 120 rubles.

[Rudik] Now the situation has changed. The salary paid to a library director before the introduction of the UWS has been increased by 293 percent. For a librarian without a skill rating, the salary has been increased by 182 percent. But that's not all: Directors of cultural organizations, institutions, and enterprises are given the right, in concluding collective contracts, to include commitments—over and above those stipulated in the overall wage terms—to raise salaries for arts workers who hold the honorary titles "People's Artist" and "Meritorious Artist." Rank and file workers have not been overlooked either. For example, salaries may be increased for cinema mechanics, library workers, and other specialists at cultural-education institutions in rural areas.

[Yurkin] Significant changes have been made in the wage system for sailors, hydrographers, divers, and command personnel on Russian Navy support ships. Will this be an incentive in their work?

[Rudik] I think it will. The international classification of command personnel positions was used in devising the skill requirements. For example, captain is followed by the position of senior (chief) mechanic, and the position of second mechanic is equivalent in pay to the position of senior captain's assistant. This was done not by lowering the pay grades for captains' assistants, but by raising the pay grades for the mechanics.

The positions of other support ship crew members have been standardized.

Substantial changes have been made in wages for divers. Instead of three specialization groups, divers have been assigned pay grades four through eight, with grade eight reserved solely for Defense Ministry divers. Additional pay for skill ratings have been maintained for them. For the first time, the question of wages for nonstaff divers on sea (roadstead) ships for time spent working underwater has been resolved.

[Yurkin] There is one other category of Russian Armed Forces civilian personnel that we have not touched on—employees of district, fleet, and army staffs. Please explain how they will be paid.

[Rudik] The UWS wage principles do not extend to state administrative agencies. Wage terms for these employees will be set forth in the Russian Federation Law "On State Service." In the meantime, the decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and Government "On Regulating Wages for Employees of Representative and Executive Government Agencies" is in effect, together with the Russian defense minister's Order No. 129 of March 8 of this year.

The provisions of defense minister Order No. 130 apply fully to the civilian employees of military administrative agencies as concerns the procedure for calculating and confirming wage funds, providing percentage-based additional pay for uninterrupted service and regional coefficients, and providing material incentives to such employees; up to six monthly wage funds (based on a one-year period) may be used for these purposes.

Now that I have described the special features of wages for various categories of civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces, I consider it necessary to call attention to the certification of directors, specialists, and technical execution personnel for the purpose of making sure that the employee is qualified for the position he holds and determining his wage grade in accordance with the UWS. This certification is quite different from previous ones and is designed to ensure effective measures to improve these employees' material situations and to reinforce their wages' incentive role, based on social justice principles.

I want to emphasize that certification will be required for all directors, specialists, and technical execution personnel (including those working on a part-time basis) of military units, institutions, military educational establishments, enterprises, and organizations, with the

exception of medical and pharmacy employees. For them, the wage grades will be set on the basis of the previous (1991) certification's results. The job of introducing UWS wages will be overseen by the unit commander. At the commander's discretion, the mostly highly qualified employees of financial agencies, labor agencies, and personnel departments, economists, and other specialists may be enlisted in it.

In view of the special characteristics of this time and constantly rising inflation, which is aggravating social tension in certain labor collectives, we are pinning special hopes on smooth and efficient work by commanders and specialists of financial agencies and labor and wage agencies who are best qualified to introduce the new UWS wage terms. It is our common duty to do everything in our power to ensure that the civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces receive their newly recalculated wages in the shortest possible time.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-ekonomicheskii zhurnal," 1993

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Pyankov on Missions, Prospects of CIS Peacekeeping in Tajikistan

94UM0238B Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 4,
26 Jan 94-1 Feb 94 p 5

[Interview with Colonel-General Boris Yevgenyevich Pyankov, commander of coalition peacekeeping forces, by Yuriy Kushko, Dushanbe; date of interview not given: "Blue Helmets Also Go With Kyrgyz Boots"]

[Text] Were it not for the presence of Coalition Peacekeeping Forces of the CIS in Tajikistan, local groupings might have already yielded to the temptation of taking up arms. The fact that the latter are still observing neutrality and are restraining themselves from active operations on a large scale is, in the opinion of Colonel-General B. Pyankov, the commander of Coalition Peacekeeping Forces in this hot spot, one of the chief results of the three months' stay of troops under his command on Tajik soil.

[Kushko] Boris Yevgenyevich, what made formation of the Coalition Peacekeeping Forces (KMS) necessary?

[Pyankov] To answer this question I need to first carefully explain the situation in which Tajikistan found itself with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Having divided political power, the army and the plants with ease, the former Soviet republics were unable to divide up their joint security just as easily. This was chiefly true of Tajikistan, where internal conflicts transformed into civil war, and threatened assumption of a regional nature and spread to the borders of Russia itself. External aggression also promoted development of the conflict.

All of this required CIS countries to take adequate steps to provide assistance to our neighbor in misfortune. A

decision to establish coalition peacekeeping forces consisting of armed forces from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was made in September 1993 at a meeting of the leaders of the Commonwealth in Moscow. The Treaty on Collective Security signed a year and a half ago in Tashkent by six CIS states was the basis for the decision.

Ideally, United Nations "blue helmets" should have taken on the role of peacekeepers, but today the potential of this organization is behind its growing peacekeeping responsibilities.

[Kushko] Sending peacekeeping forces into Tajikistan generated a number of apprehensions. The Russians wonder if their country is going to be drawn into a new Afghan history. Citizens of other countries wonder if Russia is continuing to demonstrate its imperial ambitions.

[Pyankov] We have a clear position in the Tajik conflict—we are not interfering in any political scrapes, which differs favorably from the position of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where support was rendered to one of the dueling sides.

Our main objective is to provide assistance in protecting and defending the borders. That's precisely where over 20 percent of the personnel of the peacekeeping forces are.

Our other functions include analyzing the military and political situation in the region, protecting humanitarian aid columns, and participating in the negotiation process with the goal of stabilizing the situation. But in no way are we providing any military assistance to local groupings.

As far as assertions of Russia's so-called imperial ambitions are concerned, such a statement of the question is wrong. The fact that I am a citizen of Russia doesn't mean my unconditional subordination only to Russian leadership. I bear equal responsibility before the heads of state and defense ministers of five countries.

At the same time Russia doubtlessly has its own interests here as well. It cannot but be troubled by the position of the Russian-speaking population. Around 200,000 Russian-speaking citizens still live in Tajikistan. As we know, in May of last year one of the leaders of the opposition already attempted to declare them to be hostages.

[Kushko] What might the effect be of giving the Coalition Peacekeeping Forces the status of "blue helmets" of the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?

[Pyankov] It seems to me that implementing such a proposal would encourage the participants of the Tajik conflict to begin negotiations. Moreover it would mean international support to our actions. In this case we have no opposition at all to international inspections or to participation of foreign military contingents in our

actions in Tajikistan. Unfortunately our proposal regarding this matter was not supported at a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[Kushko] To what extent is reliance being placed on weapons in the actions of the peacekeeping forces, and to what extent on political methods?

[Pyankov] Actions of the Tajik opposition in preparing for new combat operations are evoking countermeasures from our side. We are reinforcing the borders, we are undergoing planned combat training, and we are undertaking various sorts of preventive actions. The KMS have up to 25,000 personnel, up to 2,000 tanks, 350 infantry fighting vehicles, 350 artillery guns, and aviation and helicopters. These forces are capable to opposing any enemy. But we are not in any way placing our reliance solely on methods of force.

[Kushko] To what extent are countries that signed the agreement on the KMS fulfilling their obligations?

[Pyankov] Only Tajikistan and Russia have fulfilled their obligations completely regarding allocation of the needed quantity of men and equipment. Russia is having to carry the main burden—up to 50 percent of all of the expenses. Russia placed the 201st Motorized Rifle Division at the disposal of the KMS as its "initial membership dues."

A separate motorized-rifle battalion was allocated from Uzbek armed forces. Operational use of one of the subunits of the Kyrgyz contingent is difficult because it is based on its own territory. The Kazakh contingent still hasn't arrived. Nor have promised resources for the maintenance of the joint command of the KMS arrived from Kazakhstan. However, my hope is that the leadership of Kazakhstan will fulfill adopted obligations in the immediate future.

[Kushko] Boris Yevgenyevich, how do you think the situation will develop in Tajikistan in the immediate and remote future?

[Pyankov] The situation remains complex, despite the apparent lull. There are three main forces capable of destabilizing it.

First, the government in exile, operating from the Afghan city of Talukan [transliteration]. It is openly preparing armed detachments to fight the present leadership of Tajikistan. The Talukan exiles, who have not received recognition from a single state or support from their own people, may undertake harsh steps.

The second force is the democratic opposition, which is presently working underground in Tajikistan. It has the support of the inhabitants of a number of regions, and it has contacts with the Tajik opposition in Moscow. If the detachments of the former People's Front that do not have a clear political orientation go over to its side, its importance will increase significantly.

I consider the armed detachments in the Pamirs and the several large detachments operating in the mountains in the vicinity of Garm to be the third force.

All of them may become active in spring in their struggle for power, which can seriously worsen the situation.

A more favorable scenario for the development of events is also fully possible. Assuming presence of goodwill and a readiness of dialogue among all participants of the Tajik conflict, the situation may stabilize to such an extent here by the end of 1994 that we would be able to begin reducing the KMS contingent.

Support to Collective Peacekeeping Forces

94UM0202A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 9, 1993 pp 36-38

[Article by Major-General G. Yelchishchev, chief of operational rear services and transport of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Staff: "Army and Navy Rear Services: Support to Collective Forces"]

[Text] The political and economic processes now occurring in regions of the former USSR are resulting in destabilization in some places, causing crisis situations, and sometimes provoking adjacent countries to intervene in the affairs of significantly weakened and disunited republics. In this situation, the governments and parliaments of a number of CIS countries are giving serious thought to their national security and seeking to ensure it, among other ways, in the form of collective security, through integration in defense issues within the commonwealth framework.

The member states of the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—are cooperating closest of all in the defense sphere. Among other things, the treaty calls for coordinating the member states' activities in basic areas of the mobilizational readiness of their armed forces and economic structures and for drawing up recommendations on key aspects of military-technical policy and on equipping the member states' armed forces with weapons and military hardware.

An agreement entitled "On Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States" was signed earlier, in March 1992. Under this agreement, collective peacekeeping (also known as peacemaking) troops were designated from virtually all the CIS states. Depending on the capabilities and interests of each specific country, these forces take the form of a battalion, regiment, or division. In addition to combat units and subunits, the military observers group and collective peacekeeping forces can include command personnel, administrative services, an expert group, a military police group, and logistical and technical support subunits (units).

The basic approaches to the organization of rear service support for the collective forces are still being worked out on the basis of the experience of UN multinational peacekeeping forces and command and staff games and exercises.

The legal basis for rear services support to the peacekeeping forces is the protocol "On the Structure of Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Their Manning and Logical, Technical, and Financial Support." For example, it states that logistical and transport support for observers, units, and subunits is to be provided by the state that allocates the manpower and equipment or, alternatively, by other Commonwealth member states. This option for providing support was adopted as the basis at an operational assembly of the Main Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, as well as in the course of a command and staff war game that dealt with the training and use of peacekeeping contingents.

The first phase of the command and staff game, which was held against the backdrop of the situation that has arisen in the Central Asian region by decision of the chiefs of states (the decision was confirmed by their parliaments), called for the creation of an observers group and collective peacekeeping forces from units and subunits of five Commonwealth countries. The need to clarify fundamental issues relating to logistical, transport, and other types of support in the peacekeeping operation mandate became apparent even then. This also applies to support to observer groups that, as a rule, will be sent far in advance of peacekeeping forces and operate in observation zones autonomously, in groups of five to 10 men. Unless it is determined in advance how they will be supplied, disruptions and misunderstandings are inevitable.

In modeling the observers' actions, we relied on the experience of the UN, in which the observation areas and objects are determined first, and then the territory is divided into command and staff zones of responsibility for organizing the work of these groups and ensuring that they receive comprehensive support. A mobile transport subunit with communications equipment is set up in each zone. It is indicative that a number of the inspectors have life support sets containing all essential supplies, from binoculars and bullet-proof vests to food products and personal hygiene items.

In speaking about the specific mechanism used to support the observer groups, it is quite clear that much will depend on the situation. For example, the observer group that operated in Tajikistan was based with units of the 201st Division, and no special supply problems arose. But not everything went smoothly. For example, the border troops command refused to supply a helicopter to evacuate 12 observers from Kurgan-Tyube when combat operations were under way in the city. Colonel I. Ozerov, chief of an operational rear services and transport group of the CIS Combined Armed Forces

Staff, was then tasked with evacuating the observers to Dushanbe. Breaking through to Kurgan-Tyube and back while under fire in two armored personnel transports provided by the 201st Division, the officer accomplished his mission, for which he was decorated with the Order of Personal Bravery. The conclusion was drawn that if observers are operating separately in disparate areas, their main transport equipment must be armored, and their equipment stocks must guarantee that the groups are mobile and can operate autonomously.

It was thus proposed at the command and staff war game that there should be one all-terrain vehicle, such as a command and staff vehicle, for every 10 observers, and that it should be equipped with work and rest areas and a life-support module allowing at least 10 days' functioning.

It was proposed that the equipment and supplies be air-dropped together with the personnel using the manpower and assets of the countries providing the military observers.

The example of providing rear service support to the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf region is indicative. Their success was to a considerable extent predetermined by the prompt creation of logistical and technical support facilities. The American command had 13 major arms and ammunition stockpiles, up to 10 fuel and lubricant depots, and 17 supply ships carrying aircraft fuel, diesel fuel, food, and other supplies in the region. All told, there were enough reserves to supply 180,000 men for 30 days. Consequently, in preparing the CIS collective forces for operations, it would obviously be a good idea to establish support facilities for them in advance. In general, this task can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of an analytical forecast of potential areas of tension, a study of their possibilities from a rear service standpoint, a determination of the manpower and equipment to be used in the operations, and a procedure for augmenting them.

In view of the peacekeeping forces' coalitional character and the fact that it is not always possible to envision their exact makeup, we considered during the command and staff war game the option of creating modular rear service supply sets. It was proposed that the composition of rear services and their functional strength be based on the makeup of the peacekeeping forces: command structures and a regiment rear services supply set for every three to four battalions, command structures and a division rear service supply set for every three to four regiments, and so on. Only this approach would seem to ensure the possibility of maneuver of rear services personnel and equipment and of organizing reliable rear services support in any situation.

An example of such organization is provided once again by the operations of the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf. The number of rear service units and subunits in the first command varied in relation to the

grouping of forces and the character of combat operations. This was facilitated by a bloc, or nonattached, structure of the main rear service units. For example, a fuel and lubricants supply battalion could have from one to two supply companies and from two to four fuel and lubricant transport companies. The same applies to other rear service subunits.

The command and staff war game also reviewed the option of using local economic capabilities to support peacekeeping forces. Specifically, it was planned to attach observers, for all types of supplies to units and subunits already in the observation zone. Furthermore, if, for example, there is a petroleum products depot with required types of fuel and lubricants in the zone of responsibility, efforts must be made to use that depot to augment stocks on site; the same applies to buying fresh vegetables and fruits, obtaining fuel and water, and carrying out sanitation-hygienic, antiepidemic, and other measures.

In a number of cases, it is impossible for peacekeeping units to deal with such matters as restoring facilities along communication lines activated for their transport support. It must be pointed out that support can hardly come solely from the states providing the peacekeeping forces or solely from the use of local resources. Support is most likely to be of a mixed character. In any case, the use of local capabilities is always desirable.

An indispensable condition for the timely and uninterrupted support to peacekeeping forces is clear-cut command. For this reason, it was deemed advisable at the command and staff war game to form a combined staff for the military observers group and the CIS collective peacekeeping forces under the Main Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces. This staff would operate on a permanent basis and include a functional subdivision to manage rear services and transport supply. At the same time, it is important to have close cooperation between the rear service command structures and combined-arms staffs. A veil of excessive secrecy between them will be detrimental. This was the case in the Transcaucasus a few years ago, when an operational rear services group was not told which airfields would be used to bring in airborne assault units and how many units would be coming. The result was fuel shortages for the military transport planes.

According to normatives, the basic peacekeeping force unit—the reinforced battalion—is to have supplies for three to five days. But to ensure autonomous operation, it realistically has to have food and fuel reserves for at least 30 days. At the same time, the battalion has no agencies that can take delivery, properly store, stockpile, and distribute equipment and supplies. The conclusion is clear: A peacekeeping unit or subunit operating autonomously must be reinforced from a rear services standpoint and be equipped with compact equipment for life in the field, for storing large reserves of equipment and supplies, and for obtaining, storing and disinfecting water. Calculations made at the command and staff war

game show that the following supplies must be on hand in amounts over and above the prescribed levels:

- at the regiment level, a mobile field bakery, MMP-2 (MPP-6) mechanized compact laundry units, a PKS-2m mobile field kitchen and mess hall, an AVTS-1.7 vehicle-mounted water tank, 200 bullet-proof vests, tanks for extra fuel supplies (nearly 600 metric tons), one camp tent for every 10 men, one officer camp tent for every two to three men, staff tents, and standardized tents for housing staffs, storing weapons, ammunition, food, and other equipment, and four bundles of canvas;
- at the battalion level, one AVTS-1.7, one PKHB-0.4, tanks in an MSB (motorized rifle battalion) for 60 metric tons of fuel, for 1.8 gasoline refuelings, and for 1.4 diesel fuel refuelings (in a PDB, tanks for 50 metric tons of fuel, two gasoline refuelings, and two diesel fuel refuelings), and tents in the same ratio specified for the regiment level.

The units must also have three MK-30 and KP-20 field kitchens per battalion to support an outpost, posts, and patrols.

A peacekeeping operation can last a long time. And by the end of the first month, it will likely be necessary to have a temporary rear service group to take delivery of equipment and supplies from the republics' national commands and to distribute them to the peacekeeping forces. When operations are very prolonged, and also when forces are introduced to prevent local conflicts on external borders (based on the experience of the command and staff war game), it will be necessary to create up a forward support facility for the collective forces.

It must be pointed out that supporting mixed collective forces is in itself a difficult task. And as some Commonwealth states introduce their own currencies, take steps to equip their forces with Western arms and equipment, set their own supply norms, and introduce their own uniforms, this task will become more and more difficult. When the Warsaw Pact countries' joint armed forces existed, a system of bases and stockpiles of equipment and supplies was created, and effective efforts were made to establish a common transport network and system for maintaining it. Protocols and agreements were rigorously observed. But the question of supporting coalitional groupings, especially in the course of counterstrikes and counteroffensives away from supply bases, has never been fully resolved. The same applies to standardizing rear services manpower and equipment. Therefore, in our view, in order to avoid or at least alleviate the problem of using collective peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS states' armed forces must follow common rear service support principles and preserve a common rear service support system, common rear service organization and common operational tactics. Preserving the most important integrative components of the rear service system of the former Soviet armed forces is also

invaluable—above all a common defense communications network and maintenance elements and regional rear service preparations. It is important to take common approaches to the creation, stockpiling, and siting of logistical supplies for the Combined Armed Forces and armed forces of the Commonwealth states and to the operation of mobilizational agencies to deploy rear service troops and installations.

Finally, the mobilizational and operational plans of the former Soviet armed forces were formulated with due regard for the actual correlation of forces and equipment and capabilities for utilizing them. Corresponding logistical, technical, and transport facilities were created. In destroying it, the Commonwealth states are dooming themselves to a struggle for survival in which each state is on its own, and this poses problems.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-ekonomicheskii zhurnal," 1993.

Peacekeeping Operations in Former USSR

PM2302142594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Dr. of Military Sciences Professor Ivan Vorobyev under "Information To Ponder" rubric: "'Gaps' in Theory, or What We Lack in Order To Carry Out Peacemaking Actions"]

[Text] Russia is the only state on the territory of the former USSR which today is actually voluntarily carrying out the peacemaking functions which it has taken on. More than 16,000 Russian servicemen have now been mobilized to fulfill tasks in various parts of the former Union. The problem of "peacemaking" has acquired such topicality for our Army that this circumstance was reflected in the "Main Provisions of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." As is known, the document defines the main internal sources of military threats, to counteract which the Armed Forces may be used.

Such actions are by no means a novelty for the world community. Considerable experience of carrying them out has been accumulated. Thus, since the adoption of the UN Charter (1975), when their legal status was defined, 26 peacemaking operations have been carried out under UN auspices, of which 13 have been completed to date and the rest are continuing. At the same time this problem has not yet been worked out in our military theory—which is fraught with unjustified combat losses when carrying out actions of this kind. I believe that it now appears possible, on the basis of the accumulated experience, to draw certain theoretical and practical conclusions in respect of the conditions, forms, and means of preparing for and conducting peacemaking operations and the participation of armed forces in them. All the more so because great attention is being devoted to this question in a number of states—for example, in the United States, the FRG, France, and Britain. Thus, U.S. politicians believe that under conditions of increasing instability in various parts of the

world there will be an increasing likelihood of military interference in events which do not attain the scale of a war. This is also confirmed by the main provisions of the new U.S. military doctrine, which is known unofficially as the "Clinton doctrine." Special regulations on the conduct of peacemaking operations are being drawn up in accordance with this doctrine.

In principle, a peacemaking action is aimed at settling a conflict which arises and normalizing the situation by peaceful, diplomatic means, without bloodshed. In practice, however, this is not always achieved. While in the buffer zone, the "blue helmets," who are called upon to separate the warring sides and to monitor observance of a truce, frequently find themselves as kind of hostages when the situation becomes exacerbated, as is happening in Yugoslavia, for example—they fall between two fires. In this instance the UN Charter (Article 42) does not rule out the use of strong-arm methods to restore peace.

But in our case, as already stated, a great deal in this matter has not yet been settled. It is, above all, necessary to settle legal questions within the CIS relating to the conduct of peacemaking actions and to elaborate and realize in practice the main principles for building and utilizing both Russian and interstate, coalition peacemaking forces of the CIS. To this it should be added that the problem of carrying out peacemaking operations concerns not only the specialized peacemaking forces but also other troops which under certain conditions can also be drawn into the maelstrom of crisis events.

Let us recall tragic events in the USSR, particularly in Tbilisi (1939), Vilnius (1990), Baku (1990).... The sending in of troops to resolve the crisis that had arisen not only did not yield the desired result, since it had no legal basis, but also elicited an extremely negative reaction in society and helped to fuel anti-army hysteria. That is, practice has shown that troop forces, just like law enforcement organs, are not in themselves capable of eliminating a crisis situation caused by political, economic, social, ethnic, and other contradictions. They are only capable of creating the necessary preconditions for normalizing the situation.

Which principles, by which we should be guided in the use of peacemaking (troop) forces to resolve a conflict situation, have been formulated to date?

The principle of legality should be numbered among them above all. This principle requires the personnel of the peacemaking forces to know well and carry out most stringently the legal norms and legislative acts laid down for operations in an emergency situation and to infringe in no way the freedom of the individual or human rights. This predetermines the conditions and limits of the use of physical force, special means, weapons, and combat hardware to maintain public order.

Complying with the principle of preventive-precautionary actions means envisaging measures well in advance and

taking them in time so as to prevent the development of a conflict situation, while at the same time managing, as far as possible, without the use of strong-arm methods and relying on the mechanism of talks. But moderation [mera] is needed here—tolerance and indecision must not be manifested when the situation starts to get out of control and illegal forces go over to armed violence.

The success of a peacemaking action further depends on the thoroughness of its **preparation**. The Americans believe, for example, that it takes at least four to six weeks of intensive exercises and individual drill and training sessions to prepare subunits of the peacemaking force.

The important principles also include the principle of efficient **cooperation** between the peacemaking forces and the local administration, law enforcement organs, and internal troops of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

Thus, the nature of the peacemaking forces' operations in a conflict zone depends on many circumstances. In some cases they assist the local administrative and law enforcement organs and MVD internal troops to ensure the maintenance of public order and public security. In others they bear the brunt of normalizing the situation in a region in the grip of combat operations.

In the event of the exacerbation of a conflict, when it assumes the form of an armed confrontation, the peacemaking forces must take control of the development of events so as to stop insurgent actions in time, to prevent the seizure of weapons by gunmen, and to avert acts of terrorism, shooting, and attacks on state establishments, the population, military camps, military columns, railroad trains, etc. The package of measures to be implemented in this case can conventionally be divided into three types: reconnaissance actions to expose illegal groupings, gunmen, and bandit formations; precautionary measures taken for the purpose of patrolling, cordoning off, and monitoring road traffic; strong-arm measures conducted to search for and disarm gunmen and bandit formations and, in case of resistance, to render them harmless.

At the same time it should be emphasized once again that a peacemaking action which takes the form of combat operations against illegal armed formations can only be justified if there is no alternative to it.

It is understandable that in this case the actions of the peacemaking forces are highly specific. What is needed here is a special tactic, which we also have not yet elaborated. Although it is possible to make certain recommendations on this score on the basis of an analysis of the existing experience accumulated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region.

So, on arriving in a conflict zone, it is important for the commander of the peacemaking forces to establish contact primarily with the local administration, the law

enforcement organs, and the temporary operations group of the Internal Affairs Administration in order quickly to gather data on the operational situation, analyze them, and adopt a decision on implementing the necessary measures for the peacemaking forces' participation in ensuring the legal regime of the state of emergency. In a number of instances it will at once be necessary to create special reconnaissance and search groups for helicopter patrols of the terrain and monitoring of traffic on roads and in population centers. By analyzing the operational situation which has taken shape in the zone of responsibility, it is necessary to make a forecast: how the crisis situation might develop further, what new hotbeds of tension might arise, what is the composition of bandit groups, their armament, their base regions, their operating tactics, and their control and support system, what are the sources of reinforcement and supply, what is the local population's attitude toward them.

In particular, it is known from experience that uncoordinated detachments of 100-160 gunmen armed with assault rifles and pistols are created in a conflict zone at first. Centralized leadership of the gunmen's actions is organized subsequently, individual detachments unite into larger formations, base regions, training centers, and dumps are created, weapons are accumulated, including heavy weapons, and a system of observation and identification is established over an extensive territory. Gunmen usually employ the tactics of partisan operations and periodically carry out night sallies and surprise raids, chiefly against weapons dumps and military camps. The chief purpose of their actions is to acquire weapons, means of transport, and ammunition.

Depending on the nature of the gunmen's actions and their equipment and training, the decision is made to carry out a special operation for the purpose of rendering them harmless. One of the most widespread tactical methods used for this purpose is the search. It is carried out in those cases where the gunmen's exact base has not been established and only the approximate area of their operations is known. Therefore ground and air (helicopter) reconnaissance is primarily organized. Special groups are created for a search, and their actions are backed up chiefly by combat helicopters. The pace of a search on a moderately rough semiopen terrain is of the order of 1-1.5 km per hour.

As the gunmen's location is established, the decision to comb the terrain might be adopted for the purpose of rendering them harmless. Combing can be unilateral and bilateral (from opposite directions). The starting point and the finishing point (meeting point) on a terrain offering concealment are set for subunits, and, in addition, the direction of movement is defined. When combing, subunits at first advance in a column and are then deployed in a chain, with intervals of 12-15 meters between servicemen on semiopen terrain. It is particularly important to provide for security measures and to establish clear mutual identification signals. If, when a

detachment of gunmen is detected, it offers active resistance and there prove to be inadequate forces and means for an immediate rout, then it is expedient to organize blocking by means of erecting obstacles so as to neutralize its actions. Given a favorable situation, the bandit grouping is surrounded and subsequently broken up and routed.

The most acceptable tactic for rendering harmless a large, well armed bandit formation operating over an extensive area can be the tactic of search and strike operations according to the "seek and disarm" ("destroy") principle. In this case active air and ground reconnaissance conducted over a wide front is combined with a prompt strike by helicopters and airmobile detachments (groups) landed in the region of operations against the groupings of gunmen which have been brought to light. The decision to rout a bandit formation includes the selection of the most dangerous groupings to be rendered harmless first of all and the determination of the combat structure and modi operandi of the reconnaissance and search, strike and fire, air assault (airmobile), raid landing, and blocking detachments (groups), of the means of organizing killing zones [ognevyie meshki], ambushes, and obstacles, and of the system of control, cooperation, and support.

This is just a small proportion of the questions connected with the preparation and implementation of peacemaking operations. Information to ponder, you might say. But it can be seen from this that the practical preparation of the peacemaking forces is a problem which concerns the Armed Forces to one degree or another.

COSSACK AFFAIRS

Cossack Border Outposts in Far East Set Up

94UM0216B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Col (Res) Viktor Aleksandrovich Matafonov by Aleksandr Davidyuk under the rubric "The Ataman Will Speak": "Viktor Matafonov: Our Line Is 300 Years Old"]

[Text] Viktor Matafonov was born in the year of the Victory. He completed a construction tekhnikum and then, as an external student, passed the exams for the Omsk Higher Combined-Arms Command School. He served 26 years in the Transbaykal Military District. He is a colonel in the reserve. Last April the military district of the Transbaykal Cossack Army recommended his transfer from the position of ataman of the Chita Cossack District to adviser to the head of the oblast administration for Cossack affairs.

[Davidyuk] To my knowledge, Viktor Aleksandrovich, the position of adviser for Cossack affairs to an administration has been established for the first time in Russia. What brought this about?

[Matafonov] We have a lot of things for the first time. I shall get back to that. It is just that they have begun considering us. We have developed from a group initiating the rebirth of the Cossack community into a powerful force. There is a Cossack population of more than 60,000 in the Transbaykal today. These are patriotic-minded people. Even the oblast authorities have turned to us. Right now a special group is being set up under the administration, which will work on a comprehensive program of economic and cultural rebirth for the Transbaykal Cossacks.

[Davidyuk] We have never had a shortage of good programs. But so many plans have remained just on paper....

[Matafonov] That will not be the case with us. I am now working directly with top oblast authorities. In areas with a dense Cossack population the atamans are frequently deputy chiefs for social support for the population in the rayon administrations. What do we have to show for this. It is far easier to resolve all pressing matters—the allocation of land, for example. I am not even referring to the preparation of the youth to serve in the army. We are in many ways the first in this as well.

The first Cossack subunit in the Russian Army has been created in the Transbaykal Military District. This is the Dauriskiy Cossack Company based with the Port Arthur Regiment. People throughout the nation have expressed thanks to "your Cossack outpost." I believe that this positive undertaking will be supported also in other regions of Russia.

Two Cossack outposts have been set up on the border with Mongolia and China. They guard the border jointly with the border troops. We have concluded an agreement on this matter with the district command element, although the legal aspect has not yet been completely worked out. I am confident that this will be done in the immediate future, however.

A Cossack patrol has been set up and is operating by agreement with the oblast administration and the governing body of the Transbaykal Cossack Army. It accompanies every train into the border zone together with law-enforcement agencies. It combats crime in rail transport.

[Davidyuk] In short, when the rider mounts a horse rearing to go, he had better find the stirrup at once, as the Cossacks say. From every indication, the Transbaykal Cossacks have done so, have they not?

[Matafonov] Yes, they have. There have been many obstacles on the path, though. The main problem is obtaining the money. We cannot pay wages. Thank you, Col-Gen Valeriy Stepanovich Tretyakov, district commander. He is coming to our rescue. The local administration is also chipping in. But this is all just kopecks. We need a lot of money to do a real job. Take the construction of villages, for example. There are many people who want to acquire their own farms. Right now 28 families

want to move here from Kazakhstan. They are hereditary Transbaykal Cossacks, the Lonshakovs. They want to build a village on the Argun river. It is on the border with China. We shall try to help them. We have asked the government of Russia for help in paying for rail cars to move their household goods....

Some officers released into the reserve also want to remain here. We plan to settle them along the Argun. There are fantastically beautiful places there, and hunting and fishing. It is our strategic mission to settle the border region. There are empty areas, the villages are deteriorating, and neighbors are glancing our way with increasing frequency. We welcome guests, of course, but they will not receive any land. The situation is tense there. The question of the islands in the Argun has come to the fore once again, and demarcation is underway. We are keeping a close eye on the situation, and we do not intend to be sideline observers.

[Davidyuk] You have with you an officer's saber. Where did you get it?

[Matafonov] It was given to me by the district commander.

[Davidyuk] Are you a hereditary Cossack?

[Matafonov] Our Cossack line on my mother's side, the Razmakhnins, is around 300 years old. My grandfather Vasily Ivanovich Matafonov commanded the 1st Cavalry Regiment in the Civil War. His life, by the way, is described in the novel "Zabaikaltsy" [The People of the Transbaikalia] by the well-known writer Vasily Balyabin. We are bringing up the new generation in our line, our Cossack children, properly and responsibly. But I digress. Let us get back to public matters.

We have reached agreement with local television people. We are going to have our own program. The same goes for radio. In general, you will not stop us now. There is probably no force which could stop a Cossack. Or do you not agree?

[Davidyuk] Not agree with you!...

Cossacks: News Briefs

94UM0216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian: 5 Feb 94 p 4

[Briefs under the rubric "The 'Triple-Cross' Gait"]

[Text]

Do Not Touch Yermak!

A large assembly of the Siberian Cossack Army was held in Barnaul. The Cossacks spoke with bitterness of the Russian government's lack of effort toward reviving the Cossack society. Far from all of the Cossack communities are being allocated land for their yurts as called for in

the ukase issued by the President of the Russian Federation. Cossack self-government, a unique form of true democracy and popular rights in the past, has not been established in a single Cossack village.

The Cossacks are even more displeased by the way their brothers are being treated in neighboring Kazakhstan. The situation there is complex and tense. Indignation was aroused in the Cossacks by the news that Kazakh nationalists have desecrated the memorial to Ataman Yermak Timofeyevich, legendary Russian explorer.

The large assembly of the Siberian Cossack Army approved a message to the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, which demands that they look into the situation and influence the course of events.

Cossacks Build Nuclear Submarines

Another Cossack company has joined the existing ones in northern Russia. The charter of a Cossack association established at the state center of Russian nuclear shipbuilding, in the city of Severodvinsk, has been registered in the justice department of the Arkhangelsk Oblast administration.

The association has a membership of around 60 Cossacks. Their ataman, V. Litvinov, works as a fitter/assembler in the Sevmashpredpriyatiye production association, where Russia builds its nuclear submarines.

The first constructive activity of the new association, with which the Cossacks want to make themselves known to the city, has been to help maintain public order on the streets. This involves mounted patrols in Severodvinsk. The Pegas cooperative, of which Cossack V. Manevskiy is chairman, presently has only five horses which can be ridden by the Cossacks. That is true, but as they say, where there is a Cossack, a horse will be found.—Vladimir Gundarov

Where Are the Stirrups on a Tank?

A small Cossack assembly of the Yekaterinburg Division of the Orenburg Cossack Army discussed the establishment of a Cossack formation out of one of the formations of the Ural Military District.

It is planned to form the Cossack battalion in the spring of 1994 as a Guards tank formation. The battalion is being established in accordance with the ukase issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 15 March 1993, and members of the Ural Cossack community will serve in it. The Sverdlovsk Oblast Military Commissariat has confirmed that the proper orders have been issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

It is symbolic that the formation in which the Cossacks will be serving traveled a glorious combat path during the Great Patriotic War as cavalymen, replacing their battle horses with tanks following the war.—Leonid Mikhaylov

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian-Georgian Talks Yield Three Bases in Georgia

94UM0218A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Pelts: "The Tbilisi Agreement: Something for Russia and Caucasian Peoples"]

[Text] Russian-Georgian summit talks began in the morning of 3 February in the Cabinet Ministers building located in the center of Tbilisi. The heads of the two states, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, spoke one-on-one.

Also held behind closed doors were meetings of official delegations. Oleg Soskovets, first vice premier, and Georgian Cabinet of Ministers Chairman Otar Patatsiya discussed a complex of reciprocal, primarily economic, relations.

Political aspects of intergovernmental cooperation were taken up by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev and Aleksandr Chikvaide. Representing the Georgian side in the negotiations were Dzhaba Ioseliani, chairman of the Temporary Committee on the Extraordinary Situation in the Republic, and Aleksandr Kavtsadze, chief of the State Committee on Protection of Rights of Man and Interethnic Relations. The agenda went beyond general Russian-Georgian relations to include certain aspects of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems and the situation concerning rights of non-native ethnic groups, particularly the Russian population.

Also held was a meeting between Russian Minister of Defense Army General Pavel Grachev and Major General Guram Nikolayshvili, chief of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and Major General Paata Datyashvili. Army General Pavel Grachev was highly pleased with the progress of the talks, emphasizing that it was found possible to realize agreement on the entire military cooperation agenda. Incidentally, the start of the Russian-Georgian talks was preceded by a terrorist act: Georgian Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Kekelidze was killed in an explosion occurring in his apartment on 3 February. The minister of defense himself, Major General Georgiy Karkarashvili, retired from his position on the eve of the talks. A KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent was able to determine that the reason for the retirement was "unacceptability of a policy of establishing closer relations between Georgia and Russia."

Completion of the talks was followed by the signing of a package of Russian-Georgian bilateral agreements, chief of which was the Agreement on Friendship, Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation.

Also signed was a number of intergovernmental agreements relating to trade and economic ties, status of

Russian Border Troops stationed on Georgian soil, and cooperation in science and technology, cultural matters, education, and communications. One of the agreements signed that is of great importance governs the migration process and protects rights of settlers. Another agreement pertains to cooperation in prevention and clean-up operations in emergency situations.

A provision to create three Russian military bases on Georgian soil was set down in writing in a protocol of intentions signed by the representatives of the defense ministries of the two countries. Army General Pavel Grachev stated that they could be created as early as 1994, with the sites being Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and Vaziani. The minister of defense also stated that "Eduard Shevardnadze's refusal to accept our offer of introducing Russian peacekeeping forces into Abkhazia in September of 1993 was a mistake on Georgia's part." Pavel Grachev pointed out that this was admitted by representatives of Georgia's Ministry of Defense.

Following the signing ceremony, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze held a joint press conference.

Relative to prospects of Georgia's entering into the ruble zone, Boris Yeltsin stated at the press conference that it was necessary to organize a working group which would weigh the positive and the negative aspects of this kind of step, and only after that would it be possible to make a decision.

Eduard Shevardnadze in principle shared Boris Yeltsin's view, adding that in Georgia there are ardent supporters and persons adamantly opposed to the republic's entering into the ruble zone.

Boris Yeltsin, responding to journalists' questions relative to Abkhazia's concern and alarm over the article in the agreement providing for military-technical cooperation, stated emphatically that technical assistance to Georgia is not a matter of the present. The military cooperation process is to take place gradually, in phases, tied closely to the rate of progress made in political settlement of the Abkhaz problem.

Eduard Shevardnadze in turn stated emphatically that Georgia will not be capable of creating an army without Russia, and she has no intention of posing a threat to anyone. He also said that he sees nothing that could preclude resolving the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problem. The conflict settlement process, in Shevardnadze's opinion, should proceed under the aegis of the UN and the CSCE, with the employment of peacekeeping forces, including those supplied by Russia.

In the opinion of Emil Pain, Presidential Council member, all the provisions of the Agreement on Friendship, Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation between Russia and Georgia, which today was signed by the heads of the two states, are "useful for Russia largely in the political aspect."

The Presidential Council member singled out the problem of stationing Russian troops on Georgian soil and creating military bases. "Georgia," he said, "is giving a guarantee of setting up Russian servicemen." Emil Pain continued by saying that there is a complex of strategic military agreements which are of general significance to the CIS member countries. He cited an example: It would cost Russia tens of millions of rubles if she were to erect a new border. Also of importance are agreements made with Georgia which pertain to moving Russian freight through Georgia by land and sea.

Thus, the Agreement on Friendship, Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation between Russia and Georgia has been signed. It is a thing already done. This is illustrated to some extent in the photograph of the unnamed soldier - taken by our correspondent - who is a member of the Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in South Ossetia. Thanks to young men such as he, Ossetian and Georgian peasants for the first time in many years of the bloody encounters are able to do their work as before on the land of their ancestors.

Without him, the Russian peacekeeping soldier, the knot of Caucasian contradictions could not be cut. And it seems that this is finally being recognized by those who only yesterday were shouting "occupier" at him.

In the afternoon of the day, Boris Yeltsin met with Patriarch Ilya the Second, the head of the Church of all Georgia. Later the President of Russia and Eduard Shevardnadze held a meeting with representatives of Georgia's intelligentsia. In the evening, Chairman of the Parliament and Head of State of the Republic Eduard Shevardnadze hosted an official dinner in honor of the President of Russia.

UKRAINE

Heavy Financial Burden Posed by Aircraft Maintenance Requirements

94UM0190A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysitsya under the rubric "Urgent!": "Expenses Instead of Profits—Or, Where To Get the Funds for Aircraft Maintenance?"]

[Text] I have had occasion to write more than once about the difficult situation that military aviation finds itself in owing to the lack of fuel. I will thus only point out that most pilots have not met the standards for flying time this year, and a considerable portion of them have lost their qualifications. There are units where combat readiness is maintained only by the leading combat crews.

But is the situation really hopeless for our fliers? No. I had occasion to be persuaded of this when I heard the presentations of many officials at a session of the military council of the VPS [Air Forces] that was just held in

Vinnitsa. Concrete proposals were made there with regard to obtaining funds for fuels and lubricants, moreover through the efforts of the fliers themselves. I will cite only a few of them. That will possibly promote their realization.

It is no secret that some military transport aircraft are being used to ship the most diverse types of freight, both within the borders of Ukraine and to other countries. And it is providing quite a bit of profit, both for the state and for the armed forces.

However, as commander of the military-transport aviation forces Major-General of Aviation Petro Matyukhin indicated in his presentation to the military council, the quantity of aircraft for this purpose could be increased considerably—first of all through better organizational work. Advertising, clear-cut planning and timely support are all needed here. It is not sufficient today. So it turns out that one crew flies more than four hundred hours in a year, but another takes their aircraft up for just a few hours.

Matters are sometimes paradoxical with the provision of spare parts. Some parts for the aircraft are manufactured in Kiev and are delivered to Tashkent, to the plant where the aircraft are manufactured and their servicing and repairs under guarantee are performed. From there those parts, for example the so-called UZI, are returned to us again, to Ukraine, to be installed in aircraft; but they have now crossed the borders with customs and transport charges, and are thus considerably more expensive. It is not difficult to guess where that leads.

The pilots of military-transport aviation this year gained operational experience in yet another use of the Il-76 aircraft. Here, as they say, misfortune forced them to. Fires that broke out in the forests of the Crimea demanded the use of unusual measures. The military aviators were fighting the fire in their mighty aircraft. It would be better, of course, if they did not have to do such things, but no one is insured against natural disasters. Great fires break out at various around the globe every year. The pilots of military-transport aviation could take part in extinguishing them. Their services need only be requested.

Helicopters can be used as well as aircraft for the shipment of freight for so-called commercial purposes. There is a squadron of the giant Mi-26 helicopters, say, in the regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mykhaylo Shymkov. These are the most modern rotary-winged craft, able to ship freight of many tonnes great distances, perform installation work and the like. None of them are being used today, however. The reason is that the main rotor blades and some other parts have exhausted their service lives. There is nothing with which to procure new ones from Russia, since our financial difficulties are well known. But the rotor blades do not need to be purchased. They could be obtained through barter, say, for engines for the same helicopters. Those units, after all, are manufactured here in Ukraine

by the Motor-Sich plant. The regiment even has spare engines on hand. This not-very-complicated operation need only be organized and carried out.

When the Mi-26 helicopters are able to obtain their new "wings," they will be able to repay the funds spent on them a hundred times over. Great amounts of money, after all, are spent to install just one single derrick or electrical-transmission line tower, and the gain is twofold—profits for the state and the armed forces, and experience in practical flight work for the helicopter crews. All of this need only be organized and brought to life.

The Commander of the 14th Air Army, Lieutenant-General Viktor Lyashenko, pointed out in his presentation to the military council that quite a large quantity of aircraft in good working order that are not part of the regular composition of air units is concentrated at the aircraft repair plant in Lviv. Large sums of money are spent every day to preserve them and keep them in working order. They are moreover becoming functionally obsolete, and will not be suitable for use after a certain time. They still have value today as combat aircraft, and thus could be sold to those countries where such types of aircraft are in service. So why not sell them?

The storage area also has unmanned reconnaissance drones that could lose their combat capability or become functionally obsolete after some time. It would thus be better to sell them on the world arms market. Some of the funds obtained could be spent to develop and produce more modern aircraft of that type.

Quite a few surplus motor vehicles have accumulated in the support units of the air forces. They have been mothballed, as they should be, and put into long-term storage. But there are not suitable conditions for storage everywhere. The equipment moreover grows obsolete even under the best of conditions, both functionally and physically. Considerable amounts of funds and matériel are expended in order to preserve them and maintain them in battleworthy condition as well. A proposal was thus made at the military council to conduct an inventory of all surplus vehicles, so as to determine which it would be efficient to keep, as they say, for a rainy day, and which it would be best to get rid of while buyers can still be found for them. Some of the funds received could be used to buy new, contemporary models of vehicles that are in short supply today or could be needed in the future. The superfluous vehicles could otherwise be turned into scrap metal in several years.

There is another problem. Quite a few difficulties are arising in the aviation units with the turnover of scrap metal. According to the prevailing directive instructions, all should turn over scrap metal only to the Vtorchormet organization. Taking advantage of its monopoly position, however, this outdated state organization has been dictating its own terms. All aircraft have to be cut up into pieces of the appropriate sizes and delivered by one's own transport to the receiving stations. And there, under

certain conditions, they will possibly accept them, and after some time they will possibly also pay at prices they set themselves.

It is often simply impossible to meet these conditions. Where can they get the heavy cutting apparatus? The aircraft are made from alloys, after all, such that they cannot be cut into pieces by ordinary cutting or even a simple oxyacetylene torch. And the scarcity of fuel reduces to a minimum the possibility of delivering scrap to the Vtorchormet receiving stations. Quite a few aircraft that have lived out their "winged" service are thus "rotting away" in the corners of airfields.

At the same time, as was emphasized at the military council, there are several organizations that would be glad to cut up and take away aircraft that are unfit for service themselves, and pay considerably more than the aforementioned Vtorchormet. They moreover do not ship the scrap metal outside the boundaries of our state, but rather intend to use it in Ukraine. But the "taboo" from above does not let them do so. So it turns out that it is no use to them, but they cannot give it to anyone else.

One could also make other proposals with regard to obtaining funds for the upkeep of military aviation. But these are certainly enough to conclude that we are still enduring losses in places where we could be getting profits. The approaches to resolving the problems must thus be changed. This should moreover be done today, otherwise tomorrow will be too late. The sources for obtaining funds could be gone, and the need for them could disappear if the pilots lose their combat qualifications.

BALTIC STATES

Estonia Ready To Produce NATO Caliber Ammunition

94UM0230A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Gromak: "A Big Batch of Weapons for Little Estonia, and the Estonians Will Produce the Ammunition Themselves"]

[Text] Tallin—Several Estonian enterprises are ready to produce NATO standard-caliber cartridges. This was announced by Tarmo Melder, adviser to Estonia's minister of defense. According to him, the first, test batch should come off the assembly line at the beginning of March. The adviser did not name the manufacturing plant, stating that the ministry of defense and the main staff are engaged in talks with several enterprises.

There are also counterproposals, however. The Arbadet joint-stock company, one of the co-owners of the Kaitseliit Fund, located in the city of Tuuri has provided its

services to the ministry of defense. It has been learned from well-informed sources that the Tarkon state joint-stock company (formerly the Tartu Radio Equipment Plant) is also prepared to produce cartridges, as is the (Baliyes) enterprise (the former Baltiyets plant) in Narva.

The cartridge boom certainly did not just happen. On 3 February Estonia signed the Partnership for Peace program, which apparently can absolutely not be implemented without NATO-model cartridges; particularly since the Israeli company Taas Israel Industries Ltd. recently provided Estonia with modern weapons conforming to NATO standards. The first ship from Israel delivered to the republic Galil assault rifles, (Nechev) machine guns, (Minuem) submachine guns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, 81mm mortars, 106mm guns, antiaircraft guns, missiles, guided projectiles and ammunition.

These weapons are sufficient for the republic to arm 12,000 men.

Minister on Reorganization of National Volunteer Defense Service

944K0678B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
No 2, 14-21 Jan 94 p 5

[Article by Kestutis Juskis: "Minister of National Defense Beats Back Attacks of the Opposition"]

[Text] Minister of National Defense L. Linkevicius met with representatives of the parliamentary opposition.

Referring to practical endeavors which may be accomplished prior to the adoption of a military doctrine and national security concept, L. Linkevicius stressed that it is necessary to begin to actually control the borders and airspace of Lithuania. The minister said: "We should make our contribution to the system of collective security because so far we have to a certain degree been dependents." He did not reject the likelihood of military formations from Lithuania taking part in a UN peace-keeping mission, or the need for young men in service with the army to not only take weapons and drill training but to also study the English language.

Outlining his view of the reorganization of the DSOK [National Volunteer Defense Service], L. Linkevicius said that the reorganization does not amount to elimination of the DSOK, and that under the current conditions this structure could perform the functions of a volunteer national guard and assume responsibility for territorial defense and security for important state facilities. In the opinion of L. Linkevicius, from now on only those who have been in active military service, have been recommended by their commanders, and have impeccable biographies should be volunteers.

Seimas member P. Tupikas asked whether L. Linkevicius feels morally responsible for the fact that the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, while in opposition, hampered A. Butkevicius in creating a system of national defense, compromised it in every way possible, and papers were endlessly slipped to A. Brazauskas in the Supreme Council. L. Linkevicius answered that he did not engage in these affairs.

Seimas member A. Patackas said that "volunteers are being separated from their weapons," which only staff employees will be trusted with keeping. Such employees are few; for this reason, at many locations weapons are kept solely at command posts. In the words of A. Patackas, in this situation the main principle is violated: "A volunteer should always have his weapon handy."

A. Patackas expressed concern in conjunction with the fact that a structural reorganization is also being planned after the certification of volunteers in the course of which, according to his information, they rejected the services of at least one-third of the volunteers. The member of Seimas called on the minister to remember that volunteers are a patriotic force, too; in turn, the minister observed that patriotism is not a profession, and genuine patriots cannot compromise the DSOK.

Minister of National Defense L. Linkevicius said that weapons should be stored strictly in keeping with the rules. The argument that the volunteers might need armaments at any moment in order to repulse enemy attacks did not convince him. L. Linkevicius said: "We do not have this kind of situation now," and repeated yet again that weapons are not toys.

The minister rejected rebukes that he did not demand allocation of more funds from the 1994 budget for the system of national defense. The minister of defense said: "Being a member of the government, I cannot fail to think about education and health care, too." In the words of L. Linkevicius, there will be sufficient funds for military training; however, it may become necessary to reduce the army.

Condition of Military Airports Viewed

WS2302191594 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian No 26,
8 Feb 94 p 7

[Report by Ona Mickeviciute: "Bird's-Eye and Close Views of Lithuanian Military Airports"]

[Excerpts] As TIESA has already reported, the military airports transferred by Russia have not yet been utilized until now.

It has been reiterated what valuable assets we have received, because Lithuania, recognized by the former USSR as a strategically excellent territory, has inherited 12 military airports. Many of them are situated in forests and remote places. No one cares about some of them, while disputes are continuing about the others.

The Lithuanian president, his advisers, the Seimas [parliament], and its National Security Committee will discuss the utilization of the airports in strengthening Lithuania's national defense. This will require objective information.

On 2 February, a group of officials had a chance to see the airports from both the bird's-eye and close views and explore the actual situation and the prospects for their utilization. [passage omitted]

First of all, the group went to Kazlu Ruda airport in a Mi-8 helicopter. Currently, the airport is under the National Defense Ministry ownership. Formerly, it belonged to the seventh USSR airborne battalion occupying a 60-hectare area. The airport has a 200-meter-long runway, several garages and storehouses, 12 wooden barracks, the framework of the officers' apartment block, and a two-storied underground emergency dugout for the USSR air force command. Almost all of these buildings have been either taken away or destroyed to prevent their utilization. The edifices lack radiators, electric cables, windows, and doors. Nor are there any aviation facilities.

Servicemen from the Kaunas motorized battalion of the field army brigade are working in Kazlu Ruda now. They are guarding the premises, repairing the facilities, and learning the art of war.

Colonel S. Murza, deputy air force commander, said that, thus far, military aviators had been unable to use the Kazlu Ruda base. There are plans to turn the latter into a training base and to station a squadron there, so that war pilots could gather in one place to perform common assignments. [passage omitted]

Incidentally, the Latvian military would also like to have its pilots trained in Lithuania (we have already trained their first two war aviators). The Latvians would contribute finances and assist in restructuring the base. In addition, Kazlu Ruda should house a duty air unit.

J. Lasinskas, chief of the training squadron at the rear service, who is also acting commander, said that the base was built on concrete blocks which were laid on poles driven into a swamp. All underground conduits are close to the surface or on it, the pipes are ruined, and there is no money to replace them. [passage omitted] The pavement is good, and it has only grown over with grass over the past couple of years. The Kazlu Ruda airport has no commercial value, and no one claims it. From the viewpoint of military strategy, the airport cannot be neglected.

Having flown over the Paliepieiai airport, we found out that its 3,500-meter-long and 80-meter-wide runway consisted of 10,000 concrete blocks, 1,000 of which had been sold by the Russian soldiers. Fuel reservoirs had been sold to Lithuanian and Latvian firms. There had once been plans to use the blocks from Paliepieiai in restructuring the Vilnius airport. The Paliepieiai airport

had belonged to the USSR naval force and had been an emergency base for long-distance planes.

The Kedainiai airport has become the property of the self-government.

After landing at the airport in Meskučiai, we found all the Lithuanian military aircraft—fighters, training planes, and helicopters—stored under the open winter sky. [passage omitted] Those are not top-class planes. Therefore, they are not leak-proof, and water easily gets into their engines. Only the Zokniai airport has sufficiently spacious hangars suitable for storing planes. However, these facilities have been assigned to the Siauliai self-government.

The military facilities accumulated in Meskučiai can hardly undergo major repairs because there is no equipment or spare parts. A group of highly skilled engineers with higher aviation education is trying to make spare parts itself, and it is gradually repairing all planes and helicopters deployed in Meskučiai.

A conference held at the Meskučiai base put forward the following idea: Does the National Defense Ministry [KAM] have a chance of acquiring at least some of the necessary buildings and hangars at the Zokniai airport? Air Force Deputy Commander S. Murza delivered a report about the key goals of Lithuania's aviation. These are control over the state borders and the Baltic Sea economic zone, and the supervision of the inviolability of the entire air space. Aviation should also engage in rescue operations, assist other army units in performing special assignments, and transfer other military units, servicemen, equipment, and facilities. In addition, aviation should also perform photographic work from the air and the radiation and chemical surveillance of the territory.

According to the speaker, Lithuania needs three airports. The most suitable ones are in Zokniai (Siauliai region), Pajuoste (Panevezys region), and Kazlu Ruda (Marijampole region). It was expected a year and a half ago that the Zokniai airport would become the first strategic airport in northern Lithuania. It has the best hangars built in 1989, new buildings, the possibility of installing a good flight control center, and so on.

It has a particularly good 3,500-meter-long runway (which was also an emergency runway for the spaceship "Buran"). The KAM received the buildings situated on both sides of the runway which cannot be used for cars. The zone for fighters, the launching pad, the parking lots for heavy planes and vehicles, the headquarters of the radioelectronic combat regiment, and the laboratory went to Siauliai City. "The security of entire Lithuania was sacrificed for the benefit of the city and for temporary finances," stressed Colonel S. Murza. "The airport which was too large for Russia has become too small for Lithuania." The self-government has forbidden the military even to drive across its territory. Therefore, quite a long road will have to be built on the other side. This might cost the military about 0.5 million litai.

The conference was also addressed by Captain J. Marcinkus, commander of the first air base, who noted that the runway belonged to the self-government, but that the services for maintenance, navigation, and flight control could be common—as is the case around the world. The self-government uses only part of the buildings (which the aviators need). The devastation of many facilities is continuing. The compact territory belonging to the self-government has all the buildings necessary for the normal work of the national defense air force, for the organization of the air defense, and for the installation of repair and engineering facilities, laboratories, and a maintenance unit.

In the opinion of A. Norvilas, the president's adviser for national defense issues, and A. Orenius, adviser to the Seimas National Security Committee, a special commission should be set up and a project drafted for national defense. The fate of the Zokniai airport might change then. The decision of the former B. Lubys' government concerning the division of the airport will not be revoked unless there are some serious arguments. However, A. Norvilas told a TIESA correspondent that military aviators should be supported.

From Meskuiciai we flew to Zokniai and inspected the deplorable buildings allotted to the KAM. After the "excursion" in Zokniai, the airport in Pajuoste (Panevezys region) looked tidy and well-groomed. [passage omitted] Thus, the restoration of the Pajuoste airport may not require large finances, if the decision to use this heritage for Lithuania's national defense is adopted.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Recruiting Mercenaries in Russia

PM0103103194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Feb 94 pp 1, 2

[Igor Andreyev report: "Russian Military Commissariats Recruited Mercenaries for Azerbaijan's Army"]

[Excerpts] At least 150 Russian mercenaries from Tula, Kaluga, Ivanovo, Tambov, and Vladimir Oblasts were recruited in December of last year by representatives of the Azerbaijani Army with the participation of local Military Commissariats, and were dispatched to the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani military conflict. Documentary evidence proving this fact is in the hands of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS), which was the first to pay attention to the strange behavior—to put it mildly—by officials in the Russian Armed Forces.

The ill-starred mercenaries, who have already left the army of sovereign Azerbaijan, are today unanimously talking about an entirely legal recruitment campaign for contract servicemen which was launched by the oblast military commissariats at the end of last year. Judging by the advertisements that were posted, the call was to service in CIS "hotspots." The terms were tempting: 500,000 rubles [R] per month, one-half of this sum in

dollars. It did not occur to any of the dozens of people who fell for these promises that the recruitment was not to the Russian Army but to the armed forces of another state. The volunteers did not immediately realize what they were joining, even after a visit to the military commissariat. Some read the terms for themselves, while others were kept in the dark until the last moment. One thing unites them all—when flying out to Baku every one of them knew where they were going and what for.

A. and N. from Kaluga (the editorial office has their full details) were immediately given to understand what was going on by staffers of Kaluga's Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, who said: "Go to Azerbaijan as mercenaries. You will be able to get a large sum of money. War is of course a risk, but you can make a profit from it...." When the volunteers were brought to the assembly point, there were around 60 men already there from various rayons in the oblast. Addressing them, A. and N. recall, the oblast military commissar did not speak about Azerbaijan, but only said that where the detachment was going "people only died through stupidity." He did not give a direct answer to the question: "Are we going to Azerbaijan?", reporting that representatives of the recipient military unit would arrive in the next few days, and they would explain everything.

B. from Kaluga came to the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat following an appeal on local television by a staffer of the Oblast Military Commissariat, who announced the recruitment of reservists for service in CIS "hotspots." Convinced that this concerned the Russian Army, B. arrived in the city of Yefremov, where the Kaluga volunteers were united with the Tambov volunteers. There, for the first time, he saw the "representative of the recipient military unit," elderly Azerbaijani Guseynov, wearing badges of military rank unknown to B. on his military tunic under his civilian coat. In mid-December, the combined detachment went via Moscow to Ivanovo airport, where they united with the contract servicemen from Ivanovo and Vladimir. On 20 December, 92 mercenaries flew out to Baku by an Azerbaijani civil aviation Tu-154.

According to Ch. from Kaluga, the recruitment of volunteers was done with the most active participation of officials of the oblast military commissariat, who closely cooperated with representatives of the Azerbaijani Army. However, as a rule, neither the Russian military nor their foreign colleagues enlarged on the ultimate aim of the impending visit. They even kept silent when all the volunteers knew the truth. The Azerbaijanis, the mercenaries recall, freely made use of the military commissariat reservists' discount cards, bought them food in cafes using cash, and apparently did not suffer from any shortage of funds. [passage omitted]

All the former mercenaries questioned by the FCS are convinced that the oblast military commissars and their subordinates who were working directly with the contract servicemen could not have failed to realize that they were assisting in the recruitment of Russian citizens

to a foreign army. That they participated in deceiving volunteers who did not initially suspect where they were going to serve. The aforementioned A. stated that staffers of local military commissariats had "set up" the volunteers, that all the Azerbaijanis' conversations with the mercenaries were conducted in the presence of Russian military, and the latter responded immediately to the requests of "the representatives of the military unit"....[passage omitted]

Although not a single legislative act mentions the concept of "mercenary" at the moment, according to many of my interlocutors from the FCS, the actions of the military commissariats fully come under Article 171 of the Russian Federation Penal Code, which covers cases when officials exceed their power and authority to the detriment of Russia's interests. No matter which side we look from, the damage is clear: The country may be accused of supporting the idea of mercenaries, while the Russian Army failed to recruit all the contract servicemen which it might have recruited. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation Armed Forces command is apparently not noticing the December "recruitment," just like it did not notice such cases in the past. As [counterintelligence officer] Vladimir Makarov claims, the "signals" about the flourishing mercenary business had already reached the military department, the former Supreme Soviet, and the Prosecutor's Office.

On 23 February, the FCS leadership (let us note that the department managed to "unravel" this story in a situation extremely unfavorable to itself, straight after the president's December edict on abolishing the Russian Ministry of Security) officially sent a letter to Colonel General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, setting forth all the circumstances of the case. The IZVESTIYA editorial office is also waiting for the reply.

When called by IZVESTIYA, Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov, with whom we are well acquainted because of the January 1990 events in Baku, answered that he does not know anything about the involvement of Russian military commissariats in the recruitment of mercenaries for the Azerbaijani Army. He considers claims about such cases as someone's conjectures, and the conversation essentially premature. "When we obtain documents from the FCS, we will conduct our own investigation, and then we will return to this subject...."

Defense Minister Views Career, Karabakh Conflict

944K0712A Moscow SOBESEDNİK in Russian No 6,
Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Serzh Sarkisyan, minister of defense of the Republic of Armenia, by Mikhail Serdyukov in Yerevan; date not given: "Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sarkisyan: 'Why Do We, Lieutenant, Need Foreign Land?': When I Turn My Ardor to My Family, It Means the War Has Ended..."]

[Text] ...And it seemed that this happened yesterday. There were more bullets than people on the streets of blockaded Stepanakert. Serzh said to me: "We are being shot at like in a shooting gallery. But all this will end soon. We will take Shusha (the city fort, a former health resort on a high hill overlooking Stepanakert—Mikhail Serdyukov)."

Shusha seemed to be and was inaccessible. There was incessant firing from there: cannons, "barrages," and when the snipers aimed, it was always for the forehead. Only an out-and-out Suvorov or a totally mad descendant would dare to assault this monster. Serzh is a person without extremes. He just established an army of self-defense forces of Artsakh. He is a philologist.

They took Shusha. And a lot more. They moved military operations beyond the boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh. Serzhik became a national hero. Researchers will also study the phenomenon of this commander. But for the present...

For the present, there is a new blockade. Of all Armenia already. An economic blockade, and it is the most merciless. There is no light or gas, and there is little to eat. The army is shattered. The president of the republic invites Serzh Sarkisyan to the post of minister of defense of Armenia. He is surprised, but he leaves his family in Stepanakert and goes to frozen Yerevan. This is where we met.

[Serdyukov] I have already been warned: It is the practice in the higher echelons of Armenian authority to use strictly official forms of address: "Mr. President, Mr. Minister." How should I address you?

[Sarkisyan] As an old friend.

[Serdyukov] Thank you, Serzhik. What kind of songs is the minister of defense singing today?

[Sarkisyan] I am still a long way off from a personal performance. But I like to listen to the White Guard's songs. Malinin's, for example.

[Serdyukov] He sings sincerely: "Why do we, lieutenant, need foreign land?" If I readdress this question to you—will you be able to answer it?

[Sarkisyan] Go ahead and ask: Why did you seize Azerbaijani territory. In autumn of 1992 we were able to stop the Azerbaijani Army and got an opportunity to keep Nagorno-Karabakh. But how was this to be done? After all, Stepanakert was being battered by cannon from the well-known Agdam—point-blank. You even took a picture of a little girl with a broken leg—have you forgotten?

[Serdyukov] Can you really forget such a thing? Do you know how she is living now?

[Sarkisyan] She is alive. But others died. Azerbaijani Army groups that were concentrated on our borders continued to hit cities and villages. After all, every sector of the republic was fired on from there. And that could

have gone on endlessly. It is impossible to compare Azerbaijan's military potential in any way even with that of Armenia, not to mention the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic]. There are not many Karabakh residents. And there was only one solution: Only through bravery and attack could we demoralize the huge Azerbaijani force. We circulated the disinformation that allegedly we were appeased. We said that we expected the next attack of the Azerbaijani Army in the spring of 1993. And we gave assurances: They will not attack us in the winter and, of course, everyone could ease up...

[Serdyukov] And did they take the bait?

[Sarkisyan] Yes. In January of 1993 the Azerbaijanis began a powerful offensive in the firm conviction that we were not ready to repel them. Within two weeks they were completely exhausted. We launched a counteroffensive. The aim was to straighten out the front. This required going outside the NKR's boundaries.

[Serdyukov] You really got outside them very well! You captured up to one-fifth of the entire Republic of Azerbaijan. You were suddenly transformed from defenders of your own land to aggressors.

[Sarkisyan] Of course, for Azerbaijan, this is aggression. Although there is a nuance: After all, they do not recognize the NKR as an independent state, and continue to consider the Karabakh people as their subjects. So, what kind of aggression is this? Our people against our people. I will say frankly: We do not need their land. We were simply ensuring the safety of our families. And supplying the army with captured weapons. Furthermore, Karabakh has been completely destroyed and burned down. Three years of war is no joke. But with what does one rebuild? At whose expense? There is nothing in Armenia, and the mice are dying from hunger in empty cornbins. There was only one solution: Get the building materials in Azerbaijan.

[Serdyukov] In Azerbaijan they think they are fighting against Armenia.

[Sarkisyan] They can be understood. It is embarrassing to admit that, having such a powerful military potential, they cannot achieve victory over tiny Karabakh. Although I know: They clearly realize this among themselves. They do not want to admit publicly in Baku that they are at war with Karabakh. After all, they have been unable up to now to take even one Armenian soldier captive. I met with the minister of defense of Azerbaijan in Tbilisi recently at the initiative of Russian General Reut. He tried to prove to me that regular subunits of the Armenian Army were participating in the war. He showed me the identity papers of a captured soldier with the inscription "Volunteer." A passport with the registration is Yerevan. I explained to him simply, in the Russian language—in the presence of Reut: We have many prisoners, both Russian and Ukrainian, but I am not saying that Karabakh is at war with Russia or with Ukraine.

[Serdyukov] Does this mean that you did not succeed in coming closer to an agreement with your Azerbaijani colleague?

[Sarkisyan] We did not achieve anything. This meeting was an initiative of the Russian general. His personal initiative. Without any authority from Moscow. As he said: "He has great personal desire for this war to end more quickly."

[Serdyukov] But what about you, do you have another desire?

[Sarkisyan] God forbid! And the Azerbaijan minister of defense wants the same.

[Serdyukov] A paradox: Everyone wants peace, and the carnage continues.

[Sarkisyan] The trouble is that an end to the war means different things for us and for them. For Karabakh, the end of the war is recognition of independence. But for Azerbaijan, as their minister of defense put it, "the return of all of the administrative units, including Karabakh as well..."

[Serdyukov] But this is a closed circle! With the arrival of Geydar Aliyev, a cautious person, the hope has emerged in you personally that you will finally come to an agreement?

[Sarkisyan] When he came to power I did have this kind of hope. Alas, it has now been dispelled. Under Aliyev, Azerbaijan ended up completely militarized. Everything there is now absolutely subordinated to war. The people, the economy.

[Serdyukov] Are there really no prospects?

[Sarkisyan] I do not see any, and there is already no choice now even for Aliyev. Because many people perished during his time. He has to have at least some kind of justification for this. I am confident that if in a month Azerbaijan loses a million or two million soldiers, but at the same time returns some part of their territory, no one will begin to reproach Aliyev. The sacrifices will be justified. But if he does not succeed in achieving anything, he will be held responsible, as others were.

[Serdyukov] What millions are you talking about? What is this, world war?

[Sarkisyan] But already today almost twice as many have been killed in Azerbaijan as in the whole war in Afghanistan. According to the most conservative figures, 25,000-26,000! And in Aliyev's opinion, 3,500 persons are in captivity in Karabakh, 800—in Armenia.

[Serdyukov] But how many in fact?

[Sarkisyan] We do not have that many prisoners. He is confusing them with those who are missing in action. But we even earlier asked to gather up the bodies. However, the Azerbaijanis did not do this. Why? Well, so that the people would have no idea of the extent of their own

losses. And they are not gathering up the bodies now. Although Karabakh is ready to grant this opportunity at any time.

[Serdyukov] How big are Armenia's losses?

[Sarkisyan] One of ours against 12 Azerbaijanis.

[Serdyukov] Serzhik, what about a campaign against Baku? While sitting at one time at a Karabakh table I also had occasion to hear this outlook from the mouths of soldiers of the self-defense army.

[Sarkisyan] This was a joke, very likely, a drunken one. You understand, Azerbaijan has an objective, and after achieving it, it will conclude the war. Enter Stepanakert—that is all. Period! Karabakh does not have an objective at present. It has one task: to stand at the present line and repel attacks. There is no point now for a Karabakh soldier to reach so that the war will end. We do not need Baku, nor on the whole even one centimeter of land. And the Karabakhs will return all the territory of Azerbaijan without vacillation as soon as they receive guarantees that they will not shoot in the direction of their motherland.

[Serdyukov] What kind of guarantees are you talking about?

[Sarkisyan] Recognizing the Karabakh Republic. The introduction of peacekeeping forces in the area of conflict. We cannot believe in words anymore. After all, even in the Azerbaijan system Karabakh was autonomous and had some guarantees according to the USSR Constitution.

[Serdyukov] I have already been shivering with cold with everybody in Armenia for a week. I met quite a few Yerevan people who curse the war to the hilt. They are convinced that it is precisely Karabakh that brought them to complete impoverishment, chronic freezing, and a life of semistarvation. Do you not consider the possibility of exacerbating Armenian-Karabakh relations?

[Sarkisyan] Now is not the time for division. Only unity will save us today. And the leadership of Armenia declared more than once that it agrees to any decisions at which the two belligerents arrive. There would be peace.

[Serdyukov] Will it not become boring for you to live in peace and quiet? What will you occupy yourself with, as minister of defense? Or as philologist Serzhik Sarkisyan?

[Sarkisyan] I have not thought about this. But I know one thing: The first day of peace will be the happiest day of my life. But as a philologist, perhaps I have lost many professional qualities.

[Serdyukov] What is your specialization?

[Sarkisyan] The Armenian language and literature. I graduated from the University of Yerevan and returned home—you know how closely I was watched in Karabakh by the Azerbaijani leaders. To them, a person who

received his education in Armenia and had some ideas and national habits was considered a social outcast. But I was invited to the city party committee of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and I became the supervisor of the sports and mass-defense branch. Then I became the secretary. There I really felt the pressure. All "lucrative" positions went only to one's own. They spat on the Armenian language. It was forbidden to write and speak it. But after all, Armenians living in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] comprised 70 percent of the total population.

[Serdyukov] Peace is as good a time as any for language. But what will you do with the uniform of a military minister?

[Sarkisyan] Well, I do not have any kind of uniform. Remember the old camouflage uniform I wore in Karabakh? It is in my wardrobe. This is my entire military dress.

[Serdyukov] But what about the gold shoulderboards? After all, the minister has some kind of rank?

[Sarkisyan] Captain of the Reserve. But this goes back to peaceful times long ago. What am I supposed to do, confer a rank upon myself? How could I then look into the eyes of the professional military? After the capture of Shusha, while still in Karabakh, they wanted to promote me to general—I refused. I consider myself a civilian to this day. But I became military, even if the minister, out of necessity. On the other hand, when I meet with ministers of defense of other states (they are all marshals), I am not intimidated. I am dressed in civilian clothes, and I converse with them as an equal. Military rank obligates one to something. And then I am not a particular expert in military commands. I show up among the troops in a regular suit.

[Serdyukov] But how do you command... without commands?

[Sarkisyan] My favorite command is "forward!" Everyone knows this.

[Serdyukov] Is this when, pistol in hand, you lead soldiers in an attack?

[Sarkisyan] That also has happened. But I was not minister of defense of Armenia at the time.

[Serdyukov] Were there many military in your family?

[Sarkisyan] Not one. A grandfather was shot in 1937. He was a shepherd. My father was a blacksmith since the age of 13. He has been on pension a long time, but until now he has been in the Stepanakert defense rayon repairing weapons. Mama has worked all her life at the silk combine. In Nagorno-Karabakh. My wife, a music teacher, and two of my daughters are there now.

[Serdyukov] Why do you not take them to Yerevan?

[Sarkisyan] It is warmer there. And although the bombing has started again, both daughters are going to school. No one will be going to school in Armenia before spring.

[Serdyukov] But the territory of Armenia is also being fired on now. We already have the first victims. Is yet another war starting?

[Sarkisyan] We could respond to these provocations with power strikes. But, after all, this will really lead to a wide-scale war. I see two reasons here. With these incidents, the Azerbaijanis, thinking that our army is fighting in Karabakh, are allegedly trying to draw off some of our forces. And to show to the whole world that they are fighting Armenia, but not Karabakh. We are avoiding such a war in every possible way. Although I should put our aircraft into the air, and a strike from which they will not recover quickly will be delivered.

[Serdyukov] Are the pilots, excuse the stupid question, Russian?

[Sarkisyan] You are being insulting. They are all Armenian.

[Serdyukov] Incidentally, nothing has been heard for a long time about the pilots who were knocked down in the Stepanakert skies—a Russian and a Ukrainian. I met with one of them, pilot Bilichenko, two years ago in prison. He was convinced he would be shot.

[Sarkisyan] Of course, they are criminals. But I think that their life should be spared. But this is not their war, why did they get into it?

[Serdyukov] And are the mujahidin fighting in Karabakh now?

[Sarkisyan] Afghanistan has not admitted this fact officially. I think they are right. After all, a mujahidin is not a soldier of the Afghan Army. They are ordinary mercenaries.

[Serdyukov] Have you succeeded in taking any of them captive?

[Sarkisyan] Not for the time being. They fight in the rear. They stand as defensive detachments, and they shoot retreating Azerbaijani soldiers. But there is a captive Turkish officer. I know for a certainty: There are many Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian officers fighting.

[Serdyukov] Do you have enough such volunteers on your part?

[Sarkisyan] We do not have mujahidin, believe me.

[Serdyukov] Tell me, please, is your army helping Karabakh with weapons?

[Sarkisyan] We acquired some things for them in third countries, in the West. But this is meager in comparison with what the Azerbaijanis are losing themselves and what the Karabakhis acquire after successful strikes of the NKR defense army. This is on the order of 120 tanks,

powerful artillery, and whole depots of infantry weapons and ammunition. Even the Armenian Army does not have such stores of weapons as there are now in Karabakh.

[Serdyukov] But where did Azerbaijan get so many weapons?

[Sarkisyan] They do not have to go far. A hundred tanks were acquired recently in Ukraine. Also aircraft and ammunition. Incidentally, they do not deny this there. They justify it by the difficult economic situation. In addition, according to the information of prisoners and captured materiel, it can be said that Azerbaijan acquired many new T-72 tanks. Where? It is obvious to us: Russia. For example, in Nikolayev they received BMP-2's [infantry combat vehicle] not so long ago. Ammunition was delivered from Tula.

[Serdyukov] Does our Grachev deny all this?

[Sarkisyan] Of course. The entire Russian leadership, civilian and military, flatly refuse to admit their military assistance to Azerbaijan. It is just a pity that your country does not take one thing into account: Our enemy is acquiring weapons not only from the countries of the near abroad. In China—assault rifles. In the Czech Republic—machine guns and grenade launchers produced in 1993. All this firepower falls on tiny Karabakh. But how is one to understand this from the human standpoint?

[Serdyukov] Well, fine, but did you not have a conversation in this regard with Grachev himself. By telephone, but man-to-man?

[Sarkisyan] Our president engages in this. But I think that if there was a conversation with Grachev, it would not have changed very much. The chaos that exists in the arms trade, in my opinion, cannot even be controlled by the minister of defense of Russia.

[Serdyukov] If you had the opportunity to talk with our president, what would you say to him?

[Sarkisyan] I want to request one thing of Yeltsin and of all Russians: Act in such a way that our Karabakh does not perish. You are powerful. Help us.

[Serdyukov] I know that general mobilization was declared in Azerbaijan a long time ago. What is the case in this respect in Armenia?

[Sarkisyan] The minister of defense does not need this. For the time being. But it is difficult for me to guess what will occur tomorrow.

[Serdyukov] Have you gotten very tired in recent years? Do you have a desire to lie in bed for a few days and at least once to sleep as much as you want?

[Sarkisyan] I would not refuse, of course. I do not get more than five hours of sleep a day. But then I think of

the boys who are fighting today in the mountains in 40 degrees of frost. For two-three months in the forward area...

[Serdyukov] What is your biggest misfortune in life—what is it associated with?

[Sarkisyan] I have lost so many friends in recent years. These were fellows who deserved to live. The sadness is not to meet with them anymore on this earth.

[Serdyukov] Serzhik, for these years of the war, your chest should be glistening with medals.

[Sarkisyan] But there are no combat decorations in Armenia. There are in Karabakh: combat crosses of the first and second degree. Azerbaijan has the title of national hero. They are fine fellows.

[Serdyukov] And what cross do you have?

[Sarkisyan] Imagine, I have none.

[Serdyukov] And if you had some free time, what would you engage in?

[Sarkisyan] I would go hunting in our Karabakh forests. There is no more beautiful place on earth. With Robert Kocharyan, my boyhood friend. He shoots very accurately. With a rifle.

[Serdyukov] Better than you?

[Sarkisyan] We have not competed for a long time.

[Serdyukov] Did you have occasion to shoot in the war?

[Sarkisyan] Rarely—but it happened.

[Serdyukov] Do you get a chance to read books?

[Sarkisyan] To my great regret, no.

[Serdyukov] And you have probably not seen your family for a long time?

[Sarkisyan] I have a real Armenian family. The husband commands in it. I like this most of all.

[Serdyukov] Do you really have little to command at work?

[Sarkisyan] Too much.

[Serdyukov] But what is the matter?

[Sarkisyan] The fact that when I turn my ardor to my family, it means the war has ended.

Military Call-Up Results Announced

944K0702A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 17 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Vagram Stepanyan: "Armenia Will Have a Full-Strength Army by Spring"]

[Text] [words illegible] successfully. This statement was heard at a briefing of state minister of the Republic of

Armenia and Chairman of the Republic Call-Up Commission Vazgen Sarkisyan, at which Major General Artur Arutyunyan, chief of the republic's Main Mobilization Administration, was also present.

According to the state minister's report, the republic call-up has been fulfilled by 100.16 percent. These are not simply figures—a real person stands behind each of them. For the first time in the past four years the call-up was organized and conducted on the exterritorial principle, i.e., none of the conscripts, not counting individual exceptions, will serve in the places of his immediate [words illegible]. However, as he noted, there are still regions where the call-up periods have been extended for good reason. In particular, in Gyumri and Vanadzora it will go on for another 10 days in order to bring the lacking 511 and 244 persons respectively up to strength.

Thus, speaking in military fashion, the task has been accomplished. However, the task is not limited only to a quantitative aspect. It also has a qualitative side which must be made sure of by thorough, daily, and goal-directed work in the units. Otherwise, the successfully completed first stage of the campaign will prove to be a useless waste of effort, time, and funds. Actually, it is already possible today to talk about the existence of the institution of the organizing of national armed forces. Now the matter depends on the improvement of their military training and combat readiness, as well as on the establishment of general army discipline. Incidentally, according to Mr. Sarkisyan, a number of commanders of different ranks have been relieved of duty for non-fulfillment of these requirements as well as for inability to create conditions for the psychological "assimilation" of new recruits and lack of skill in investigating their non-regulation (neustavnyy) interrelations, which has led to certain accidents. Some 147 deserters are already on the run from this recruitment through the fault of such apologies for commanders. Criminal punishments will be applied to them.

Basically the call-up went without hindrance and in an organized manner.

At the same time, as the briefing participants noted, there are still parents who suffer from the "defect" of protecting beloved children from service in the army in every way possible. Such psychology is characteristic also of refugees from Azerbaijan and the Yezids who constitute a national minority in the republic. Nevertheless, the assurance was expressed that as a result of the appropriate actions this situation will be set right by spring, i.e., by the next call-up.

Answering the journalists' questions, the speakers reported about the intention to conduct regular inspections in military units which will make it possible to eliminate shortcomings and to resolve various problems. Today, in the words of the state minister, they have no problems with food and clothing. There exists only a problem with barracks. The fact is that in the southern part of the republic there are none at all and one must

build new ones or [word illegible] old ones. [word illegible] important task one can [word illegible], the latest news [word illegible] also in the creation of higher educational institutions which will permit replenishment of the ranks of the national army with highly educated and skilled officers.

In conclusion Mr. Sarkisyan expressed gratitude to all the services that participated in the call-up campaign: The rayon military commissariats, internal affairs organs, military police personnel, and local authorities as well as the journalists present for assistance in the successful completion of the autumn call-up.

ARMS TRADE

Weapons General Designers Appeal to Yeltsin

94UM0207B *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian
19 Jan 94 p 1

[Letter of General Designers to Yeltsin: "Guns Back Up to the Market"]

[Text] Very esteemed Boris Nikolayevich!

In the course of the last two years, a new system for the organization of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries was worked out and established through the joint efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and the defense industry. A fundamental reorganization of the system for the export of arms was begun under the leadership of the Interdepartmental Commission on military-Technical Cooperation.

At the present time, a number of stages of the plan for the reorganization of military-technical cooperation approved by the Government of the Russian Federation have already been realized:

- a consultative and supervisory council under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations made up of representatives of developers and manufacturers of export arms has been established and is working actively;
- financing-industrial groups oriented toward the export of arms have begun to be formed and a new system is being established for the interaction of defense enterprises with specialized foreign economic associations of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations ("Oboroneksport," "Spetsvneshtekhnika," and GUSK);
- a powerful and reliable system of military-technical cooperation is being established that relies on developers and manufacturers of arms employing the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which will provide for the comprehensive servicing and modernization of domestic military equipment at the foreign customer and will expand the volume and forms of exports and services for technical assistance to the foreign buyer;
- certain changes have been made in the structures of foreign economic associations dealing with the export of arms, their leadership has been replaced, etc.

At the present time, the established system of military-technical cooperation is fully workable and basically fulfills the functions assigned to it, although it is not free from shortcomings (parallel efforts in individual areas of the work of foreign economic associations, bureaucracy, and a long time for the drawing up of contracts), which, in our view, can be eliminated through customary methods of everyday work. For this reason, the withdrawal of specialized foreign economic associations in a particular stage (as foreseen by Edict No. 1932c of the

President of the Russian Federation from 18 November 1993) may lead to the disorganization of the program planned and approved by the Government of the Russian Federation for the reorganization of military-technical cooperation. Also unavoidable are the following negative consequences:

1. The receipt by foreign partners and arms customers of information about the fundamental reorganization of the All-Union association "Oboroneksport," the state foreign economic company "Spetsvneshtekhnika," and the GUSK, which have many years of experience in international weapons markets, will doubtless lead to increased uncertainty among them about the stability and possibility of Russia to fulfill its obligations in the area of military-technical cooperation. This threatens the conclusion of a number of new contracts and the incipient positive trends in the development of military-technical cooperation. The losses in connection with the cancellation of contracts are estimated at about \$2 billion.
2. The establishment of the state company "Rosvooruzheniye" means the actual transfer of the state monopoly for trade in weapons to an economic entity, which violates the integrity of the work being carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to pay off the debts of foreign countries to Russia and to eliminate the state debt of Russia to suppliers of arms and military equipment.
3. The establishment of the new structure in the system of military-technical cooperation will disrupt the organized utilization of a single infrastructure for the foreign economic activity of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, including foreign representations (trade delegations), through which most military-technical cooperation with foreign countries is carried out today.

The edict of the President of the Russian Federation from 18 November 1993 was not coordinated with the departments responsible for the status of military-technical cooperation. It appears that actions for its realization are in need of serious coordination on the part of interested organizations.

In connection with what has been stated above, we ask you to suspend temporarily the effect of the edict and to entrust the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation with the preparation of proposals in relation to its realization.

B. Bunkin, general designer of the scientific-production association "Almaz,"

V. Yefremov, general designer of the concern "Antey,"

G. Yefremov, general designer of the scientific-production association for machine building,

Yu. Perunov, general designer of the Scientific-Production Association imeni P.S. Ploshakov,

V. Kireyev, general designer and general director of the Novocherkassk Engineering-Reclamation Institute,

M. Simonov, general designer of the Experimental-Design Bureau imeni Sukhoy,

A. Kuznetsov, general designer of the MAK "Vypmel."

This letter and the material published on page 2 were prepared for printing on the eve of the first meeting of the Federal Assembly. We decided to put off its publication only so that we would not exercise even indirect influence on the results of the election of the speaker of the Council of the Federation—the figure of V. Shumeyko was already looming behind the scenes of this political drama.

The Russian senators have now made their choice and V. Shumeyko is now beyond the reach of justice.

But the trade in Russian weapons is a magnitude immeasurably greater both economically and politically. In our view, the documents that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is publishing today must attract the close attention of parliamentarians and perhaps a parliamentary investigation will be required. After all, the powerful main designers of Russian weapons, whose letter to the president we are publishing simultaneously, actually did not accomplish anything, although they raised the same questions to the highest state authority that are contained in the publication of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

In refraining from the publication of this material on the eve of the elections for the Council of the Federation, we actually contributed to some degree to the election of V. Shumeyko to the highest post in the legislative structure of authority. While congratulating him on this success, we would also like to say that the repression to which RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has been subject until now emanated and continues to emanate from the closest circle around the president, to which V. Shumeyko also belongs. At times this repression has the nature of petty revenge. They either shut down RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA or "punish" it in some other way for criticizing the scandalous "settlements" in the highest echelons of power, which attained the character of permanence and are diverting the strength of officials away from affairs that have now reached a deplorable state. For example, they cut off the telephones for government communications, as happened in October and continues to happen to this day, although the editor's office pays very well for this kind of service. As they say, the poor are very inventive and those in power are crafty in their repression, although prudence is very much preferable today.

Beneficiaries of Reorganization of Russian Arms Exports

94UM0207A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Vasilii Kryukov: "Guns Backing Up to the Market: Who Benefits From the Reorganization of Arms Exports in Russia"]

[Text] *Not all of what is stated below can be attributed to the adventure genre, nevertheless the past and subsequent events may serve as a good basis for the writing of a very "intense" detective story. I will begin my story on a by no means noteworthy date—10 September 1993....*

Precisely on this date at about 10 in the morning, three uninvited citizens entered the office of Maj-Gen Valeriy Braylovskiy of the State Foreign Trade Company [GVK], "Spetsvneshtekhnika" [SVT] of whom he remembered only one very well—V. Goncharov, senior justice adviser and investigator of especially important matters under the Procurator General of the Russian Federation. This visit ended with the forced transmission of several documents of a very delicate nature and the formulation of an official paper with the following content:

Protocol of a seizure [of documents].

Moscow, 10 September 1993.

The investigator of especially important matters under the Procurator General of the Russian Federation, senior justice adviser Goncharov, with the participation of witnesses....seized documents confirming the transfer of \$2.5 million to the firm "Telamon Ltd." in Switzerland.

The seizure began at 1015 and ended at 1110.

The documents shown by V.G. Braylovskiy were turned over voluntarily.

The following documents were confiscated for inclusion in the case:

1. A contract (agreement) between the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika" and the firm "Petromex Commodities Ltd" on the redemption of 50 percent of the shares of the firm "Artan Ltd.", No. 287 (25)93 from 4 March 1993 on two pages....
3. Agreement No. 25 on intentions from 1 March 1993;
4. A letter from 4 August 1992 No. 3-171 on the transfer of \$2.5 million on one page;
5. Letter No. 01-T-19 to the firm "Telamon Ltd." from "Petromex Commodities Ltd." on one page;
6. The letter of the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika" from the firm "Petromex Commodities Ltd." on the transfer of \$2.5 million to the firm;

The letter of the firm "Telamon Ltd." to "Seabeco Group" on the receipt of \$2.5 million from the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika" on one page....

V.G. Braylovskiy, president of the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika," made the following statement: "The GVK 'Spetsvneshtekhnika' informs the representative of the Procurator General comrade Goncharov of the confidentiality of the information contained in the confiscated documents and takes no responsibility for the subsequent divulgence of information set forth in these documents...."

As a matter of fact, Valeriy Georgiyevich Braylovskiy had no interest in divulging the details of this deal, because to begin with the company of Mr. Leybovich "Petromex Commodities Ltd." that belongs to the holding group "Seabeco" used money belonging to "SVT" to cover its debt to the company "Telamon Ltd."

It may be that the Procurator General will answer the questions of what later happened to this \$2.5 million and how it benefited the business people there as well as other questions.

In general, it is not so important what financial jungles our businessmen got into from the arms business. Something else is of interest: Who put through this dubious undertaking and how, with what advantage for himself? As for the person of the initiator or most active participant in the adventure, knowledgeable people name Dmitriy Yakubovskiy, the legendary witness of the infamous Interdepartmental Commission Against Corruption.

The confidentiality of the information, about which the president of "SVT" was so insistent, also involved something else: Vladimir Shumeyko, first vice-premier of the Government of Russia, took part in the story about the "Seabeco Group."

I quote one curious document from 16 March 1993 (style and spelling retained):

To First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V.F. Shumeyko.

Esteemed Vladimir Filippovich.

At the present time, our organization faces qualitatively new tasks in the export and import of arms and military equipment to foreign countries, including the countries of Western Europe.

The solution to this task foresees the displacement of traditional suppliers from new markets, which forces us to apply nonstandard methods such as action through third firms accompanied by deals in general-purpose output (metals, fertilizers, etc.). This is dictated by the complex foreign-policy situation in the world with respect to the export of arms in general and in the Russian Federation in particular.

For this purpose, we chose the holding company "Seabeco Group," Switzerland, which is presently carrying out a large volume of export-import operations involving general-purpose output from the territory of the former USSR.

In connection with what has been stated, I ask your consent to the establishment of a distributor network through the acquisition of 50 percent of the shares of one of the companies of the indicated holding for the sum of \$5 million, attributing the expenditures (considering their productive nature) to overhead expenses for exports while reducing the compulsory sale of foreign exchange proceeds to the state....

V.G. Brailovskiy, president of the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika."

Let us put aside the verbal camouflage such as "non-standard methods" or "complex foreign-policy situation in the world and in the Russian Federation" (?) and let us ask ourselves one very simple question: how did the GVK "SVT" benefit from the acquisition of shares and the establishment of a joint company in Zurich on the basis of the firm "Seabeco Group," which Leybovich, Brailovskiy and others had joined even before that (4 March 1993). After all, initially by no means the main role was assigned to "Spetsvneshtekhnika" in this game—it could not control anything and the only use that it had from the shares that it acquired was the fact that they served as a kind of guarantee for the return of the loaned sum. At least that is how one can understand point three of the contract from 4 March 1993: "The indicated sum of 5 (five) million U.S. dollars is compensated by the firm through the transfer to the company of 50 percent of its (the firm's) profit obtained from the activities of the joint firm in the course of the time necessary for the compensation of the \$5 million."

But whether the assistants of Vladimir Filippovich who first dealt with the question failed to see these reefs or whether some other considerations influenced the decision that he made, the first vice-premier was favorably disposed to the idea of the president of the GVK "SVT." Here is his resolution from 24 March 1993: "Concur with the proposals of 'Spetsvneshtekhnika.' Proceed as instructed and present proposals on execution." That was a very specific instruction but it was in violation of all the canons of administrative ethics—it by-passed the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which included "Spetsvneshtekhnika," and Vice-Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, who was supervising the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations at the time. Also unnoticed was the fact that juridically the deal had already been made and they are either substituting the first vice-premier or he is helping out someone else.

In this philanthropy (the sending of money to Switzerland), one can clearly see someone's enormous personal interest rather than noble intentions. What we have is deception of the state and also of domestic producers of weapons, to whom the "SVT" has long been in debt.

It seems that the destruction of the former system for the export and import of arms in accordance with the President's Edict No. 1932-c from 18 November 1993 will leave this question unanswered, for the established state company for the export and import of arms and military equipment ("Rosvoorusheniye") will hardly want to take on the responsibility for the previous obligations of specialized foreign economic organizations to Russian weapons manufacturers. And they number more than 4 million people, of whom more than 800,000 work in science. It is 70 Russian city-plants and entire regions such as Udmurtia and Perm, Nizhegorod, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, and other oblasts.

It is very problematical whether the new structure can return to Russia the debts of foreign countries—and they amounted to \$120 billion over the last few decades. Or whether it can pay off our debts to suppliers of arms and military equipment. In any case, the current minister of foreign economic relations does not see any prospects for the domestic arms business. Under his proposals, the volume of military-technical cooperation will decline.

The primary influence on this is the clearly the untimely structural reorganization of the export of weapons. Solid contracts for the sale and servicing of combat aircraft equipment, surface-to-air missile, tanks, and ships were endangered. They amounted to almost \$2 billion.

Officials who know what is really behind the above-mentioned edict do not deny that it is above all a number of officials at the highest level of power who are interested in removing specialized foreign economic associations from the control of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. But precisely who are they?

To answer this, it is necessary to see who has been entrusted with the management of the new "Rosvooruzheniye." For this post, the President of the Russian Federation appointed Lt-Gen Viktor Samoylov, the foreign military adviser of Vladimir Shumeyko. Once an instructor at a military academy and later senior officer at the Main Directorate for Cadres of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, he dealt with the reorganization of the armed forces in the Committee for the Preparation and Implementation of Military Reform.

It can be assumed that one of the first foreign trade operations of "Rosvooruzheniye" will be the attempt to free up the \$4.3 for 4.666 million tonnes of aluminum from Kemerovo sold by "Oboroneksport" to the Belgian firm "R.D.I." in April 1993, money that is blocked in a special account of the Rotterdam District Court. The Belgian firm had once shown farsightedness in finding a job for the daughter of the future president of "Rosvooruzheniye."

"R.D.I.," being unable to fulfill its payment obligations under the contract and not wishing to lose the valuable strategic raw material delivered to it ("Oboroneksport" quickly resold the aluminum to the English from "Optimarr"), organized the attachment of the shipment. How it was able to do this can be seen from a letter of the deputy administrative head of Kemerovo Oblast to Oleg Davydov, first deputy minister for foreign economic relations (No 23-55/88 from 5 July 1993):

A difficult situation arose in Rotterdam because of the operational and active support given to the firm "R.D.I." by its influential friends in Russia.... One of the main documents influencing the decision of the court was information from the main administrative desk of the organization of the president of the Russian Federation sent to the firm "R.D.I." with Shumeyko's fax machine, putting in doubt the right of individual officials of the foreign economic association "Oboroneksport" to sign contract documents.

Just think who these "influential friends in Russia" are who have unhindered access to the fax machine of the second man in the government.

The person of the second individual in "Rosvooruzheniye," Sergey Oslikovskiy, is known only to specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and "Oboroneksport," from where he was driven (sent to the disposition of the Ministry of Defense) on 24 November of last year for his independent attempt to take control of intermediary functions between "Oboroneksport" and the company "Terimon Industrial Establishment" in organizing the delivery of special goods from Russia, negotiations, the implementation of contracts, etc. Not without remuneration, of course, but for a commission of 20 percent. Here are some "strokes" from his business biography:

2 February 1993. An agent agreement and supplementary agreement were signed between the foreign economic association "Oboroneksport" and the firm "Terimon Industrial Establishment" for a period of 12 months with automatic extension.

From the preamble of the agent agreement: "The Russian state foreign economic association "Oboroneksport," ...hereinafter called "Association," and...the company "Terimon Industrial Establishment" represented by Mr. S.N. Oslinovskiy, hereinafter called "Consultant," concluded the present agreement...."

Commission compensation will be remitted to the Consultant at one of the banks of his choice in accordance with a written instruction that the Consultant will send to the Association. These payments will be proportional to the payments received by the Association and will be made in the currency of the received payment....

From the supplementary agreement: "The commission compensation due to the Consultant will be paid out in the course of 60 days from the date of the actual receipt of the corresponding payments in the account of the Association...."

From a letter from the managers of "Terimon Industrial Establishment" to the management of the foreign economic association "Oboroneksport":

"On 27 February of this year, S. Oslikovskiy left Geneva for Tripoli after holding a number of meetings there with people to whom it was declared that he represents S. Karasglanov (former manager of the foreign economic association "Oboroneksport"—the editor). At Dzhherba Airport (Tunis), there was no car to take S.O. (Oslikovskiy—the editor) to Tripoli and he returned to Geneva on Monday, 1 March of this year. This fact says quite a lot about his specific possibilities.

"We would like to appeal to S.K. to remove S.O. from these matters in a way that is convenient for him so that he cannot have a negative influence on the course of events...."

"It is possible that S.K. understands that S.O. visited Libya with a proposal on the delivery of materials for the sum of about \$50 million...."

Indeed, one could not find a better candidacy for the position of deputy manager of "Rosvooruzheniye." He is very enterprising.

I will not call the reorganization of the system for the export of weapons absurd. Only it is a pity that the president did not listen to the opinion of the main designers of arms, the directors of the largest defense enterprises, who tried to stop the process. Or did someone save this letter until the right moment?

Meanwhile, the domestic defense industry is in its last throes. If only it had the strength at least to rearm its own army.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Defense Industry's Plight Detailed

PM2802120594 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Feb 94 p 2

[Igor Saltykov article: "Slave Laborers in the Defense Industry's Salt Mines"]

[Text] "So, we will have to fight on. It will have to be guerilla warfare." This is how Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League for Assisting Defense Enterprises, ended our nighttime conversation. It was published by PRAVDA 19 January. A month has passed. Reflections in the upper echelons are turning the defense industry and conversion into abandoned salt mines. Guerilla warfare is becoming slave labor.

The mass stoppage of defense enterprises has begun. As a sign of protest? No, Russia's armorers, in line with their centuries-old traditions of selfless service to the fatherland, are not contemplating a strike. It is just that the majority of production units have been rendered insolvent.

Certain high-ranking compatriots and foreign consultants suggest that this is the outcome of unwise moves in an over-hasty conversion process. But the old defense complex in its current form is no longer a military-industrial complex. Some 80 percent of its output is civilian. Moreover, in a number of sectors this output is capable of competing on the world market.

The point is, it seems, that it is not the actual enterprises which have been rendered insolvent but the state. When summing up the results of 1993, it was made clear that our government has a striking talent for tightfistedness. It has managed to run up debts to the defense sector amounting not to the 700 billion rubles [R] mentioned previously, but to R1.5 trillion. And given that the matter has not gone as far as the courts (the Prosecutor's Office has enough riddles from the past to solve), there is

no hurry to advance state defense orders for 1994, or, more especially, to release credits for conversion projects.

Moreover, in this year's budget submitted by the Ministry of Finance, allocations for national defense needs continue to be pared to a minimum. They have been reduced to 46 percent of last year's level. It should be noted that this calculation is not in dollars, but in rubles. When converted into world currency, it will amount in all to just 10 percent of last year's state expenditure.

Unlike the fledgling entrepreneurs, armaments workers can do their sums with the utmost accuracy. Otherwise Russia would not still be in possession of advanced military hardware. So it is that by their estimation—which is apt and unbiased—all these things signify the total destruction of the country's defense complex. Savings in this sphere have already surpassed what is feasible: The average wage in Russia last year was R58,400, while defense sector workers earned just R28,400. And although they grumbled, they remained patient, understanding that pre-market battles are being waged. But now, in just three or four months, around 20 million people will find themselves completely bereft of the means to survive.

The consequences of this type of social explosion are unpredictable. Especially as it is not clear where the government will find trillions of rubles to meet the costs of driving this mass of the most highly skilled workers, designers, and technicians into unemployment. Or has the government drafted decrees to defer all this as state debts over the next five years or so?

The conversion of defense enterprises is becoming nonsensical. Taxes, price deregulation, interest rates for bank credits, duties, and other government deductions reduce the capacity of the domestic market and artificially generate a sales crisis. The living standards of 90 percent of the population and people's purchasing power are at the lowest possible level. When fighting for survival, who needs household gadgets, crockery, television sets, motorcycles, bicycles, sewing machines, and so on and so forth?

Efforts to survive at the expense of the export of military hardware and arms have come to nothing. Moreover, the matter no longer concerns the sale of the latest weapons, but annual assistance in the safe operation of nationally produced combat hardware purchased not so long ago by the countries of Asia and Africa, and being used with relish by the states of Europe. Russia could earn around \$5 billion for the prompt supply of spare parts alone.

Furthermore, many of these armaments are in need of upgrading. For instance, it is time to reequip combat aircraft with the latest missiles and more accurate weapon sights. However, according to information received, the Israelis and the British are already mounting French and U.S. missiles onto our MiG-21's. Whereas copyright dictates that Russian missiles be

used. But our government's inconsistency in military trade forces foreign consumers to disregard Russian rights.

The result is depressing. Last year, the value of sales for routine repair work, and exports of consumables and spare parts was just \$2.2 billion, instead of \$5 billion. Meanwhile, the impact of last fall's decision to set up the new "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, which is subordinate not to the Defense Ministry, nor to the State Committee for the Defense Industry, and not even to the government head, but to the President, was felt. And what came of this was not state discretion, but utter confusion which goes above and beyond secrecy.

The League for Assisting Defense Enterprises deemed it necessary to discuss ways of implementing the laws proclaimed by the Constitution. At the beginning of February it convened an enlarged session of its presidium. This involved leaders of the League's regional branches from Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula, Rostov-na-Donu, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Saratov. And the directors of the largest enterprises from Moscow and Bryansk regions. There was even an envoy from St. Petersburg, even though it is still undecided there whether to join the league or operate autonomously. First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin traveled to the conference, as did Yuriy Glybin and Genadiy Yampolskiy, deputy chairmen of the State Committee for the Military Industry; Security Council Commission Chairman Mikhail Maley; and even Viktor Samoylov, manager of the newborn "Rosvooruzheniye." There were almost 60 of the most authoritative and knowledgeable slave laborers of Russia's defense industry.

Journalists, unfortunately, did not have the chance to attend the conference. However, according to the testimony of visiting participants, who did not touch upon secret matters, the industrialists themselves were able to exchange all the details of their enterprises' impending period of slave labor. They coincided absolutely. And they outlined the formidable impasse of the world's largest industry. Then they demanded explanations: After all, Premier Chernomyrdin gave instructions that last year's state debts should be repaid by 1 February. But so far not a single ruble, not even a defunct kopek, has been forthcoming.

Andrey Kokoshin admitted that absolutely nothing was paid out in January. But the Defense Ministry will pay off at least 60 percent of its debts in the first quarter. Payments will start as of 10 February. At the same time he announced that he intends to petition the government to increase budget expenditure on defense. But whichever way you look at it, there are as yet no guarantees.

Viktor Samoylov for his part brushed aside the urgency of the need to supply spare parts abroad and service our military hardware sold there. He stressed that it is not worth discussing this yet, as it is a very complex question.

Yuriy Glybin noted that many problems have accumulated, but that it is necessary to concentrate on one: The oddities of the budget proposed by the Ministry of Finances.

Finally, Mikhail Maleyev revealed that the Security Council has in fact examined the requests, demands, and proposals submitted by defense enterprises back in November. And in the course of just two hours, everything was resolved successfully. The president confirmed his council's decisions. But although the instructions issued under these decision were addressed to specific individuals, nobody is in any hurry to act upon them, and some have no intention of carrying them out. The time might be ripe if not to start legal proceedings, then at least to apply some form of punishment....

The results? There are none as yet. A letter was sent to Government First Deputy Chairman Oleg Soskovets on behalf of the league 14 February. It stressed: "We earnestly request that you take all measures within your power...to support the priority sectors of the country's economy. We consider it essential that the funds allocated to defense needs in 1994 should exceed the level of planned allocations for 1993 in comparable prices by a factor of 1.3 at the very least." It was signed by the chief designers of nine of the largest science and production complexes and associations, including "MiG," "Antey," the A.A. Tupolev Aviation Science and Technology Complex, the "Sukhoi Experimental Design Bureau," and others.

Oleg Nikolayevich showed an interest. A meeting was set for 16 February. But it did not take place. Soskovets was occupied with urgent matters until late into the evening. A new week began. Will something happen today, or tomorrow?...

Admittedly, the hope remains that after the President's message to parliament opening the discussion by the People's Deputies of the budget for this year, the chance will emerge to take account of the league's appeal, which was handed over to State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin.

People, while you still have your senses, save your fatherland. Do not repeat the experience of Slovakia.

Bankruptcies in Defense Sector Not Inevitable

94UM0209A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jan 94 p 4

[Article by Irina Rukina, deputy in the Moscow City Duma, under the rubric "Point of View": "Bankruptcy Is Too Harsh a Measure"]

[Text] We waited a long time for the appearance of a military doctrine, linking to it the solution to many problems of the defense industry. Now the basic principles of the doctrine have been approved, but this has not removed any of the defense industry's concerns. And it will hardly provide any relief until priorities are defined

for the development of enterprises of the defense complex, a state policy toward these enterprises is formed and an appropriate legal situation is established.

What do I consider especially important in this area? First of all, there must be a flexible approach to the defense NII [scientific research institutes], KB [design offices] and plants. Some of them must unquestionably remain state, or "public," entities, while the rest must be told unequivocally that they are now "free" and have the authority to decide on their own how they want to continue to operate.

The designation "public" certainly does not mean any constriction of rights, however. On the contrary, they should be given as much independence as possible, even to the point of allowing them to act as responsible state clients. That is, not just the right to fill state orders but also to develop and establish a program for the production, sale and servicing of this or that combat equipment or weapon system.

If the enterprises are to act as a state clients, this will require that they set up an entire infrastructure around themselves for development, research, production, servicing and operation, the training of specialists, and so forth. In short, for the functioning of an entire area of the defense industry. These will be fairly efficacious structures. Take the Moscow Aviation Production Association, for example. During the past year and a half it has succeeded to some degree in setting up such a structure. It has learned how to set up new relations with its subcontractors, learned how not just to turn out products but how to sell them, and offered new approaches to the servicing of its products. Despite economic and financial difficulties, last year the association invested more than a billion rubles in science and as far as possible supported the design offices of its main subcontractors. Thanks in great part to this approach the enterprises retained its cooperative ties, its personnel and its capacity for producing extremely complex aviation systems. And this was despite the fact that it actually received no financing.

Prominent economists and politicians of ours assert that a market economy presupposes certain bankruptcy for many enterprises and, they say, this should be regarded as something necessary. The budget today is indeed so small that it cannot lift up the entire defense industry. But does this mean that the process should be left to take its own course?

We can and should point out that most of the enterprises have survived. There is no need to invest funds in and attempt to revive clearly unprofitable enterprises. We need to help the thriving, strong firms, but with the stipulation that they assume patronage over those which will not be able to survive on their own.

For what reason should a thriving enterprise concern itself with a clearly unprofitable one, you will ask. And are there any thriving enterprises today? There are. I am not certain that they are known, to be sure. There is a

universal cry, after all, that everyone today is engaged in commerce and no one is producing anything. Things are being produced. The fact that these producers are frequently stuck in rented space, do not have their own funds and bear an enormous tax burden is another matter.

It is very important today to find people in a firm who have actually demonstrated that it is profitable to produce things. I have no doubt that others will follow in their footsteps. Only he who has made an enterprise profitable can teach others rapidly how to do so.

If we want to revive Russia's economy, we should not anticipate large-scale bankruptcies—that is too harsh a measure—but orient ourselves toward the producer. This will not require much: Just to make the tax system not a hindrance but a production regulator. One approach should be taken to the producers, another to the commercial structures. That does not mean that the commercial structures should be pressured. It is perhaps no less important today to learn civilized trade than to learn civilized production. In order to develop trade, however, we must have goods. The producer must therefore still be in the front.

The second problem which must be solved is that of improving the banking system. The banks today are actually over industry. Nowhere else in the world are people living with loan rates like ours, more than 200 percent. If the situation does reach the point of large-scale bankruptcies, the banks will find themselves the owners of those very unprofitable enterprises. Will they be capable of running them? I doubt it. It will most likely result in the collapse of the Russian economy, and we will have to go through the process of industrializing the nation once again.

I am certainly not calling for state regulation of the economy. If we begin regulating prices, that will be the end of the market economy, since regulation is the jurisdiction of officials, and we already have more than enough of them. When I began studying marketing, I liked very much the principle of producing what is advantageous to the consumer and not producing what is not. What could be more simple? In Russia's situation, however, it has assumed some absolutely terrible forms.

Essentially only two things are required of the state to make production advantageous. I would put in first place the principle: Do not interfere and do not do any harm. The second thing would be to set up a legal playing field in which all of the rules of the game are precisely defined. If we do not help ourselves, no one else is going to do so. And something has to be done rapidly. Rapidly and correctly. Otherwise, we risk losing the defense complex as such. Without creating anything to take its place.

Khabarovsk Military Industry Enterprises To Get R70 Billion

*MK1002144094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
10 Feb 94 p 2*

[Unattributed POSTFACTUM report: "The Finance Ministry Has Authorized 70 Billion Rubles to the Khabarovsk Military Industrial Complex"]

[Text] According to Viktor Ishayev, Khabarovsk Kray administration chief, Russian Federation Finance Minister Sergey Dubinin has signed an ordinance on allocating to the kray 70 billion rubles which the state owes it for defense production orders. According to the administration chief, these funds will be used to clear the mutual debts of the territory's enterprises and fuel and energy complex.

SECURITY SERVICES**Former KGB Subunit Transferred to MVD**

*94UM0228A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Feb 94 p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Berezko: "'Vypel' Does Not Want To Be Passed On"]

[Text]

Who Will Gain if a Unique Subunit Falls Apart?

The special subunit Vypel was set up under the First Main Directorate of the KGB [State Security Committee] to "perform missions for a particular period." The subunit is manned by officers with a higher education and fluent in foreign languages.

Vypel's ordeals began with the Union's disintegration, going from one department to another more than once. It is now being prepared be placed under the wing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is generally a logical thing. The unique skills of the Vypel associates will come in very handy in combatting organized crime.

There is talk, however, that a national guard for Russia will be created out of the subunit. A worthwhile prospect, you will agree. The catch is that it has never been explained sensibly to the Vypel associates just what functions the special subunit will fulfill in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. As a result there is total uncertainty. According to preliminary reports, more than 100 of the Vypel staff have already submitted requests for discharge. What is the forecast? It is even less comforting. As many as 80 percent of the associates could leave, in which case there would be only memories of Vypel, a school of unique combat skills set up and carefully safeguarded for many years. The professionals estimate that it would take at least 10 years to resurrect the special subunit.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

20 APR 1994